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Washington, Bonn: new questions for a new government

...wo items of news happening to ...coincide demonstrate the ambiva... ...of current German-American rela...

...irst, the new Bonn Chancellor, Hel... Kohl, had made known that he will ...isiting the United States as the ear... ...opportunity.

...econd, legal steps have been taken ...st four companies in the Federal ...ublic thought by the Americans to ...disregarded the ban on exports of ...rican technology to the Soviet ...on.

...his shows that even if the new Bonn ...nment wants to make a new start ...lations with America, it won't be ...to escape the past.

...he American-German relationship, ...ite setbacks, was never poor during ...Schmidt/Genscher period. It would ...o hopeful to think that the Kohl/ ...cher team will manage an imme... improvement.

...erica's politicians and strategists ...ust as uneasy when they look at ...many as they are when they look at ...ce or Britain.

...he change in government can't alter ...in Washington's eyes, the structure ...power in the Federal Republic has ...changed. Only its distribution has.

...ashington looks upon the Kohl go...ment as transitional, so it is not ...g out high hopes for it. The swing ...right has not necessarily lessened ...ican fears about the future of the ...o Alliance.

...radicalisation of the opposition ...r Party in Britain, which is openly ...towards Nato, has upset many in ...ca: they are afraid the SPD will ...same way.

...m Washington's point of view se... questions are crucial: will Germa... able to maintain its comparatively ...equilibrium in domestic affairs or ...ents lead to a stark polarisation ...n traditionally deep-rooted poli... forces?

...Germany cease to be a pillar of ...ort for European stability in the ...diate future?

Will the neutralistic, nationalist and romantic ideas of the Greens turn this party into a wedge between the CDU/CSU and the SPD?

The new Chancellor will have to face many probing questions on possible developments in Germany when he visits Washington.

America's public feels that there has been a basic change in today's Germany. The situation has become more unpredictable, more difficult to explain.

Even Washington's satisfaction at the move by German conservatives into the corridors of power is restrained.

The American government knows that the real decision will be made during the next elections to the *Bundestag*.

In view of this situation, America's hopes are above all directed towards a change in the manner of political intercourse and in the general mood. Nobody holding responsibility in Washington seriously harbours illusions of a sudden German willingness, for example, to go along with America's tough line in foreign policy towards the Soviet Union practised by the Reagan Administration.

The limits to German flexibility and the extent of West German interests in Eastern Europe are all too well-known. particularly with regard to East-West relations Washington, to a certain extent, expects a kind of continuity of the Schmidt era.

However, Washington does expect a renunciation by Germany of its role of mediator between East and West, which Washington had often felt to be annoying, presumptuous and superfluous. Attempts by the previous Bonn government to keep an equal distance to Washington and Moscow was becoming a more and more frequent cause of strain in the United States. Reagan would prefer Kohl to make a clear commitment to the West rather than to conservative ideals.

Statements made by Kohl and his political friends on this point will guarantee the Chancellor a friendly reception from the start during his visit to the United States.

The fact that Chancellor Kohl still has Foreign Minister Genscher at his side boosts American hopes for a less strained form of cooperation than has been the case in recent years under Schmidt.



Getting to know you ... Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in Paris. (Photo: dpa)

The similar views on matters of domestic policy, such as tax policy, social policies and budgetary policy, will undoubtedly help Kohl's dialogue with the Americans.

Washington is hoping that he will be able to find it easier to push through the Nato decision on arms deployment, since he appears to be a man without too much opposition within his own party.

Admittedly, some Americans do not share this opinion: many keep an eye on Franz Josef Strauss — some afraid, some expectant.

Klaus Arnsperger

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 7 October 1982)

IN THIS ISSUE

Kohl outlines some priorities of foreign policy

Chancellor Helmut Kohl has given priority in Bonn foreign policy to uniting Western Europe. He made this clear during talks with President Mitterrand in Paris.

Kohl also made it clear this policy depends on a close relationship between Paris and Bonn regardless of whether socialist or non-socialists are in power.

He wants to foster the role of the smaller members of the European Community; than means six of the 10 members.

After Paris, the Chancellor had talks with the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, in Brussels. Both are concerned about the same issues and the prospects are good that a kind of partnership will develop here.

Kohl, who is soon to visit London and Washington, has probably taken with him a few of Tindeman's ideas.

ESTRANGEMENT between the USA and the EEC has increased alarmingly. America is now focussing more attention on Asia — "the future centre of the world" — than on Europe. This is a result of the Californian influence in American government.

European hesitation over increasing Nato arms deployment has led to doubts within the USA as to whether Europe will keep to its promise and instal 572 US missile systems if the missile talks in Geneva break down.

EUROPEAN UNITY: Tindemans believes that this already exists, but "we must want it politically".

The approaches to its realisation by the ten member states are almost incompatibly opposed.

As Belgium's Foreign Minister states with the necessary firmness: "If the economic crisis continues, the question must be asked, who wishes to go on building Europe and who doesn't?"

Tindemans therefore appealed to the new German government to knuckle down to this difficult task during the first half of 1983, when it automatically assumes chairmanship of the EC.

There is worry and scepticism in Brussels, about the new elections to be held in Germany next March.

The question is asked whether the present government in Bonn is a temporary one.

Will Foreign Minister Genscher — who is a greatly respected "European" — find time for the EEC during the German presidency if he is involved in election campaigning?

Will the negative policy pursued by Bonn under Schmidt ("not a single *Pfennig* more" for the EEC) be maintained, leaving no hopes for financing a united policy for fighting unemployment on an EEC level?

A "European vacuum" between Kohl's takeover and the new elections on March 6 is said to exist.

Hopes therefore for a German economic upswing could dwindle even further. "France, Italy, Belgium and Holland, however, are banking on a recovery of the German economy", it is said.

If Germany's businessmen and bankers fail to turn the tide of events and "invest", the economic crisis in Western Europe will worsen.

The ensuing tide of devaluations would shatter the "European Monetary System" (EMS), which has up to now been one of the belts holding the EEC together.

KOHL, following his lightning visits to Paris and Brussels, realises the extent

Continued on page 2



■ WORLD AFFAIRS

CDU and the Kremlin: not many words

There has been very little said over the past 13 years between the Soviet leadership and Communist Party and the German CDU/CSU.

When the CDU candidate for the mayoralty of Hamburg, Walter Leisler Kiep, went to Moscow, he could not find anybody to speak to.

The chairman of the CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, a welcome guest in Peking, was refused permission to go to Moscow because the Central Committee and the Politburo could not agree if the visit would be beneficial.

And then there is Alois Mertes. He was the *Ostpolitik* coordinator and foreign affairs spokesman of the CDU when it was in the opposition and is now the state minister at the Foreign Office.

He has been at loggerheads with the Russians since the 1950s when, as a diplomat, he was expelled from Moscow.

Editors-in-chief of Soviet newspapers, the Bonn faction among Central Committee officials and the Germany watchers around Leonid Brezhnev maintained party relations only with the SPD.

It was the relations between the SPD and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) rather than government relations that were instrumental in the ties between the two countries during the Schmidt era.

Party congresses of the SPD have always been attended by a number of handpicked Moscow officials and newsmen as guests.

Soviet political positions were also propagated through other than direct channels to the Bonn Foreign Office or the Chancellery. Here, the Soviet Union made use of a clever interview policy in its bid to influence West German public opinion.

So the change of government in Bonn will have a major effect on Moscow's *Westpolitik*.

The fact that Leonid Samyatin, the head of the Central Committee's International Information Department, recently said "were are, after all, also Europeans" cannot gloss over the fact that there are now few suitable discussion partners in Western Europe.

Surprisingly, even the second year of the Mitterrand government in France has not resulted in a revival of Franco-Soviet relations. And French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson recently said that Paris will continue its present policy towards the Soviet Union.

As to relations with London, there is no great inclination on either side to talk.

The Kremlin has difficulties communicating even with Italy's Communist Party.

And the situation between America and the Soviet Union would be comical if it were not so serious.

According to Soviet commentators, the Kremlin has decided that it would be useless to attempt to talk with the Reagan Administration and that it is best to wait and see.

American government circles, on the other hand, say that Moscow's leadership is so unstable at the moment that it is best to wait for the post-Brezhnev era.

It is therefore quite possible that Moscow's overtures to China are largely due to the lack of talk with Western Europe.

The overtures to China are intended to intimidate Bonn and Western Europe and Washington.

The Chinese leadership must welcome this because it enables them to exert pressure on America over its Taiwan policy. But the Moscow overtures still boil down to little more than routine.

The new Bonn government must now expect a few tactical moves by Moscow. The Kremlin hopes that such intimidation, coupled with political pressure and pressure of time, will enable it to achieve favourable results at the Geneva talks on medium range nuclear missiles and thus prevent the deployment in Western Europe of the new generation of missiles.

There can be no doubt that the missiles issue will dominate Moscow-Bonn relations in the next two years.

Soviet press commentaries after the change of government in Bonn revolved around this issue primarily. They threatened that this issue would affect not only German-Soviet relations but also Bonn's ties with the rest of the East bloc.

This means that Moscow is massively hinting at a deterioration of German-German ties, which are still directed from Moscow — despite the GDR's bid for a bit more independence on that score.

Peter Seidlitz

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 8 October 1982)

Optimism over US sanctions

The gas-pipeline dispute between Washington and Western Europe seems to have hit its peak with the imposition of sanctions against German companies.

It is likely that the dispute now will lose its tension. If there is no relaxation, the Americans will have to answer the question: who do they really want to harm? The Russians or the Atlantic partnership?

So the sanctions against the German companies are probably to show that everybody is being treated the same: French, British and Italian companies have already been hit.

The Americans have imposed the sanctions because they say that at least some of the equipment supplied has been made under American licence.

They are trying to stop the pipeline deal, which would provide gas for Western Europe and money and technology for the Soviet Union, as way of putting pressure on the Russians to ease up on Poland.

The West European companies will hardly be affected by the sanctions because they already have substitute technologies for what they now produce under American licence.

What would suffer would be the mutual trust between Europe and the USA — both in general political terms and in terms of technical cooperation within the West.

The new Bonn government thinks the same way as the last one. In fact, since the Kohl government cannot be suspected of anti-Americanism it can respond with even more credibility and toughness.

Horst Opta

(Nordwest Zeitung, 7 October 1982)

Carstens visit underlines importance of China link

Bonn President Karl Carstens is visiting China to mark the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Here Erwin Wickert, Bonn's ambassador to Peking from 1976 to 1980, reviews the decade for *Die Welt*.

Bonn Foreign Minister Walter Scheel and China's Prime Minister Chou en-Lai signed an agreement establishing diplomatic relations 10 years ago.

The agreement, prepared by Gerhard Schröder and signed in the Great Hall of the People, ushered in a new chapter in relations between two countries.

They had been trading with each other for some time, but now the volume grew fast. In the second half of the 1970s, Germany became China's second most important trading partner, after Japan.

But since then, the United States has pushed Germany out of second place as German exports have declined. An increase in China's exports here have kept the trade volume at a relatively constant DM4bn a year.

Nations with large domestic markets place a lesser emphasis on foreign trade, but considering how big China is, Germany's trade performance with it is not impressive.

In the first half of this year, German trade with Taiwan exceeded that with China. This stagnation is because China is consolidating and restructuring its economy.

But only 30 Germans are studying at Chinese universities or language schools.

Much is said at international meetings about friendship between peoples. But most of this is not much more than lip service that would not survive even a slight cooling of the climate.

On the other hand, studying in a foreign country always represents a gain because, as a Chinese adage puts is, this is something "neither robbers nor soldiers can take away."

President Karl Carstens is about to go to China on a state visit to mark the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the first state visit there by a German head of state.

Carstens will visit not only Peking but Shanghai as well, where a German consulate general is to be opened soon. (China will open a consulate in Hamburg.)

The president will hold political talks with his hosts. Though differences of views on a few issues of international politics will arise, there will nevertheless be a consensus on most issues. The Chinese understand and endorse the German wish for reunification.

Only a few years ago, Peking had doubts about Germany's détente policy.

There are fewer doubts now — especially since the Nato Summit in June when the term détente was replaced by "genuine détente."

The Chinese evidently think that Western policy makers have now realised that the Soviet concept of détente is somewhat different from ours, i.e. "peaceful co-existence". And peaceful co-existence is quite compatible with military invasions of other countries, such as in the case of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

China's foreign policy has been called unpredictable because Peking turned its back on the Soviet Union and op ned up to the West, with which it n cooperates.

But this judgment is wrong.

It has always been China's main ai to preserve its sovereignty, independen ce and territorial integrity. The bre with Moscow came when the Sovi Union violated this and tried to impo its hegemony on China.

In talking with Chinese leaders, Pr sident Carstens will realise that this st dominate Chaina's policy — especi towards the Soviet Union, but also, to lesser extent, also towards the Uni States. This applies particularly in co nection with American arms shipme to Taiwan, which China regards as i terference in its domestic affairs beca se Taiwan is considered the 30th pr vince of the People's Republic of C na.

President Carstens will also find th the current talks between Peking a Moscow's emissary, Ilyichev, will n fundamentally change Sino-Soviet rel tions, that China's view of Moscow hegemonial policy has remained unalte red and that the Peking-Moscow di is as wide as that between Moscow a Washington.

The president will also find that C na is interested in stable conditions the Third World and that it also wis for equally stable conditions in Europ

Just as we in the West occasiona ask ourselves about the dependabili of China within the Western secu concept, so the Chinese will try to le from the president whether the Fede Republic of Germany can be regard as a dependable and predictable en within their own security concept... whether new elections would bri about changes as a result of which Ge many's membership in Nato and adh rence to the Alliance's decisions co be placed in jeopardy.

Erwin Wicker

(Die Welt, 6 October 19



Continued from page 1

of hopes pinned on him and on t Germans.

Europe is almost asking Bonn to p form the impossible. And yet it is Germany's interests to make a new s in Europe after years of stagnation.

Without the EEC the Germans isolated. And in economic terms EEC treaties provide the best possi guarantee for the sale of half of Germ ny's exports.

Hermann Bohle

(Kieler Nachrichten, 7 October 19

The German Tribune

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HOME AFFAIRS

How the new team in Bonn shapes up

Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Cabinet comprises eight members of the Christian Democrats and four each from the Christian Social Union and the Free Democrats. Pen portraits of the new ministers are on page 4.

(Photos: dpa 7, Sven Simon 7, Poly-Press 3, Klaus Kallabis)

Helmut Kohl, CDU
b. 3 March 1930
in Ludwigshafen
Chancellor



Hans-Dietrich Genscher, FDP
b. 21 March 1927
in Reideburg/Saale
Foreign Affairs




...ich Zimmermann, CSU
b. 18 July 1925
in Munich
Interior

Hans A. Engelhard, FDP
b. 16. Sep. 1934
in Munich
Justice




Gerhard Stoltenberg, CDU
b. 29. Sep. 1928
in Kiel
Finance



Otto Lambsdorff, FDP
b. 20 Dec. 1926
in Aachen
Economic Affairs

Josef Ertl, FDP
b. 7 March 1925
...herschleissheim/Bavaria
Agriculture



Norbert Blüm, CDU
b. 21 July 1935
in Rüsselsheim
Labour



Manfred Wörner, CDU
b. 24 Sep. 1934
in Stuttgart
Defence



Werner Dollinger, CSU
b. 10 Oct. 1918
in Neustadt/Bavaria
Transport

...Schwarz-Schilling, CDU
b. 19 Nov. 1930
in Innsbruck
...& Telecommunications



Heinz Riesenhuber, CDU
b. 1 Dec. 1935
in Frankfurt
Research



Oscar Schneider, CSU
b. 3 June 1927
in Altenheideck/Bavaria
Housing




Rainer Barzel, CDU
b. 20 June 1924
in Braunsberg/East Prussia
Intra-German Affairs


...nrich Geissler, CDU
b. 3 March 1930
in Oberndorf/Neckar
Family Affairs/Health



Dorothee Wilms, CDU
b. 11 Oct. 1929
in Grevenbroich
Education



Jürgen Warnke, CSU
b. 20 March 1932
in Berlin
Development Aid



Diether Stolze, non-party
b. 5 Feb. 1929
in Starnberg
Government Spokesman

A Cabinet for difficult times

Diether Stolze, a journalist who, until recently worked on the Hamburg liberal weekly *Die Zeit*, has been appointed Government Spokesman, a key role.

Although not a member of the Cabinet, he sits in and is responsible for publicising its affairs.

Stolze replace Klaus Bölling, who over the years proved to be adept at selling the policies of the SPD/FDP Cabinet.

Stolze is a journalist specialising in economic affairs and his political leanings can best be described as liberal-conservative. He thus has the best possible qualifications for the job in a time when economic issues and the fight against unemployment and government debt have priority.

"What matters is the Chancellor," was the slogan the CDU, under Kiesinger, used in its 1969 election campaign. The SPD has used a similar slogan.

But a Chancellor would amount to little without a smoothly functioning team both in the Cabinet and in the Bundestag.

Kohl will find it more difficult than Schmidt because his coalition consists of three rather than two parties.

The very first days of the new government have made it clear that Gerhard Stoltenberg (Finance) and Norbert Blüm (Labour) will come to be regarded as the "strong" ministers.

Both are experts in their fields and both have the courage to state facts and step out of line, even if it means being unpopular. For example, Blüm has suggested that a wage and prices freeze for six months be considered.

Theoretically, going by what has happened in the past, the two should be constantly clashing over money.

But that is not the way things are shaping up. There are, in fact, signs of close cooperation. Blüm says his Ministry will not be distributing largesse. People will have to make sacrifices.

It is significant that eight of Kohl's men have held government posts either in Bonn or in the States: Blüm, Geissler, Dollinger, Stoltenberg, Barzel, Genscher, Lambsdorff and Ertl.

The FDP in the Cabinet is headed by Foreign Minister Genscher, the guarantor of continuity and dependability of country's foreign policy, despite the change of government.

But there are also some lesser unknown names in this essentially conservative cabinet, including Jürgen Warnke (Development aid) and Oscar Schneider (Housing).

The FDP was unable to bring in such left-wing liberals as former Interior Minister Gerhart Baum.

One of the conservatives in the best sense of the word is Manfred Wörner who succeeds Hans Apel as Defence Minister and is generally recognised as a top expert in this field.

Heinrich Geissler (Family Affairs/Health) and Rainer Barzel (Intra-German Affairs) are also acknowledged experts.

It is a point of interest that Helmut Schmidt thought so highly of Barzel that he gave him with the task of looking after Franco-German relations.

But there are also negative elements in the Cabinet — not only because (for reasons of balance in terms of party af-

Continued on page 7

■ BONN

Lots of university degrees and lots of experience in Kohl's Cabinet

The new Bonn Cabinet cannot be accused of lacking experience of government. It includes three FDP members of Helmut Schmidt's Cabinet, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Otto Lambsdorff and Josef Ertl. Rainer Barzel and Werner Dollinger held Cabinet appointments under Konrad Adenauer. Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Stoltenberg are former *Land* Prime Ministers. Heiner Geissler and Norbert Blüm have been Ministers in *Land* governments. The Kohl Cabinet includes a striking number of university graduates. It totals 14 PhDs if the Minister of State at the Chancellor's Office is included (although he is really more of a parliamentary state secretary). Three of the four non-PhDs are Free Democrats. Most are law graduates. Helmut Kohl, a graduate in political science, presides over a Cabinet including 10 legal PhDs. In average age the new Cabinet is much older than its predecessor. Only five out of 18 Ministers are under 50. Religious affiliations also differ. In Helmut Schmidt's last Cabinet Hans Matthöfer and Josef Ertl were the only Roman Catholics. Herr Ertl is now joined by the Chancellor and 10 members of his Cabinet. There has been no change in the number of women Cabinet Ministers: one. These pen portraits of them all are from the *Frankfurter Neue Presse*.

Friedrich Zimmermann, Home Affairs, is unquestionably the most controversial member of the new Cabinet. He is a 57-year-old Munich lawyer whose career has been chequered by controversy.

He was appointed business manager of the CSU, the CDU's Bavarian ally, in 1955, its general secretary a year later and elected to the Bundestag another year later.

His reputation is still affected most by the Bavarian casino affair, during which he was found guilty of perjury by a Munich court in 1960 and given a suspended sentence of four months in prison.

Ten months later the sentence was waived on appeal, the reason given being that he had been suffering from mental strain due to ill-health.

He is a loyal henchman of Bavarian Premier Franz Josef Strauss and a law-and-order man for whom the policies of his predecessor, Free Democrat Gerhart Baum, were anathema.

★

Hans Engelhard, Justice, is a man who chooses his words carefully and after reflection. He is a 48-year-old lawyer and bearded pipe-smoker who exudes an aura of gentility.

He joined the FDP as a 20-year-old student but his party career did not start until 1969, if a succession of failures can be called a start.

It was a bad year for the FDP and he failed to gain election as a Free Democratic Bundestag MP for Munich. Three years later he stood, and failed again, as FDP candidate for mayor of Munich.

Having taken over as Munich leader of the party, he was elected to the Bundestag at his second attempt in November 1972.

He has made a name for himself as his party's expert and spokesman on legal affairs.

★

Gerhard Stoltenberg, Finance, stood down as Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein to join Dr Kohl's Bonn Cabinet.

When Herr Strauss became Bavarian Premier he planned to lead the CDU/CSU in the Bundesrat, or upper house, in Bonn. But Dr Stoltenberg soon took over this role.

Kiel-born Stoltenberg, 54, is a clergyman's son who served as Minister of Science and Research under Chancellors Ludwig Erhard and Kurt Georg Kiesinger from 1965 to 1969.

He studied history, philosophy, economics and sociology and worked as a journalist before going into politics.

Norbert Blüm, Labour, is a toolmaker by trade. A few years ago he suggested that everyone took a break of up to a year in their working lives to help combat unemployment.

His sabbatical year made headlines at the time but has long been forgotten now the Bonn labour portfolio is his.

Rüsselsheim-born Blüm, 47, joined the CDU in 1950 and went to night school after working at Opel, the carmakers. He passed university entrance exams and took his PhD in 1967.

He is chairman of the CDU social affairs committees.

★

Rainer Barzel, Intra-German Affairs, is a 58-year-old East Prussian who has returned to the Cabinet post to which he was appointed almost exactly 20 years ago by Konrad Adenauer.

Those were the days when Dr Barzel, who was elected to the Bundestag in 1957, was considered one of the most dynamic CDU personalities.

He was expected to make swift headway in the party, and so he did. From 1964 to 1973 he was leader of the CDU/CSU in the Bundestag.

In 1971 he was elected CDU leader by a two-thirds majority; the other candidate was Helmut Kohl.

But then he came a cropper. In 1972 he tabled a vote of no-confidence in SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt but failed to gain the majority he needed.

★

Heinz Riesenhuber, Research, is the youngest Minister in Dr Kohl's Cabinet. He was born in Frankfurt, is 46 and a chemistry graduate.

In Bonn he has a reputation for being astute, energetic and ambitious. He joined the CDU in 1961 and by 1965 was Hesse leader of the Junge Union, the party's youth branch.

At the same time he worked in management for Frankfurt companies and gained experience abroad. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1976, concentrating on energy and environmental affairs.

★

Manfred Wörner, Defence, is likewise energetic and ambitious. He is 48 and a law graduate but well versed in defence matters despite not having served in the Bundeswehr.

He is a reservist with the rank of Lt-Col. and is a jet fighter pilot. From 1962 to 1964 he served in an advisory capacity to the state assembly in Stuttgart, his home town. He was elected to the Bundestag in 1965.

Heinrich Geissler, Family Affairs, is CDU general secretary and a political associate of Helmut Kohl's. He is 52, was educated at St Blasien Jesuit college and took a law degree.

He gained his first government experience in the office of the Baden-Württemberg Social Affairs Minister, moving in 1965 to the Bonn Bundestag for two years.

In 1967 Dr Kohl, who was Prime Minister of the Rhineland-Palatinate, appointed him Minister of Social Affairs in Mainz.

There followed a period in which the two men were close political allies and personal friends.

In 1977 Dr Kohl asked him to join him at CDU headquarters in Bonn. Two years earlier Dr Geissler published a book on poverty in the Federal Republic entitled *The New Social Issue*.

★

Dorothee Wilms, Education, is an economics graduate and student of Armin Müller-Armack, the theorist of the social free-market economy.

She is 53 and was spotted by Aenne Brauksiepe, a CDU old-timer, but did not go in for full-time politics until late in life.

She worked at the Institute of the German Economy, the Cologne research wing of the Confederation of Industry, specialising first in women's affairs, then in education and social policy.

She published a number of books and articles and was a prominent Roman Catholic layman.

In 1974 she joined the research wing of the CDU, becoming deputy business manager of the party and head of the main political department. She is unmarried and has been a member of the Bundestag since 1976.

★

Christian Schwarz-Schilling, Posts, is 52, was born in Innsbruck, Austria, and now lives in Büdingen, Hesse. His private hobby is Sinology, his political one is the media.

He read history, linguistics and East Asian studies.

As CDU spokesman on the media he has often advocated allowing private firms to compete with the Post Office. He would also like to see private enterprise given a greater share in the technical infrastructure of telecommunications.

He has been a member of the TV council of ZDF, the second channel of German TV, since last year. He is chairman of its politics and current affairs committee.

Frankfurter Neue Presse

Oscar Schneider, Housing, has [...] years been tipped for the hous[...] portfolio in a CDU/CSU Cabinet. H[...]mut Kohl appointed him to his 19[...] Shadow Cabinet, Franz Josef Strauss [...] his 1980 Shadow Cabinet.

He is 55 and speaks broad Nure[...]berg dialect. He has concentrated [...] housing since 1969, when he was fi[...] elected to the Bundestag.

He is universally acknowledged as [...] expert on the subject, although not e[...]ryone will approve of his advocacy [...] more free-market economics in housi[...]

He too is a law graduate and a form[...] senior civil servant in Bavaria.

★

Jürgen Warnke, Development Aid, is [...] man one could more readily visu[...]ise as Minister of Transport or of Int[...] German Affairs. Both are subjects [...] which he is well versed.

No-one in Bonn was expecting He[...]mut Kohl to choose him to superv[...] economic cooperation with the Thi[...] World.

In the Bundestag archives his na[...] appears once only in a development [...] context. He criticised a picture book [...] children published by the Econo[...] Cooperation Ministry.

He is mentioned much more often [...] connection with economic developm[...] of areas bordering on the GDR. Wa[...]ke, 50, was born in Berlin but moved [...] Hof, on the border between Bava[...] and the GDR, at the age of 10.

He is a law graduate and father [...] four. He is an active Protestant and [...] been in the Bundestag since 1969.

★

Werner Dollinger, Transport, is [...] He is a newcomer to his pres[...] job but has lengthy Cabinet experie[...] in Bonn. In 1962 Konrad Adenauer [...]pointed him Treasury Minister in [...] last Cabinet.

He kept the portfolio under Chance[...]lor Erhard and in 1966 moved to [...] Ministry of Posts and Telecommuni[...]tions.

He is a founder-member of the C[...] and a committed member of the Prot[...]tant Church, a level-headed man w[...] has been in the Bundestag since 1953.

★

Philipp Jenninger, Chancellor's Of[...]fice, is a man whose fairness, coo[...]rative attitude and reliability have be[...] highly regarded by Social and Free D[...]mocrats even when tempers were hi[...] in the Bundestag.

He is 50 and a law graduate w[...] learnt the ropes from influential CD[...] CSU men. He worked for three years [...] the Defence Ministry before becom[...] personal assistant to Heinrich Kron[...] Cabinet Minister and friend of A[...]nauer's, in 1963.

Three years later Franz Josef Stra[...] asked him to join him at the Finan[...] Ministry. Dr Jenninger has been in [...] Bundestag since 1969.

Gerd Rauhaus, Klaus J. Schwehn, Jürgen Tüchel and Peter J. Ve[...]
(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 5 October 1982)

THE ECONOMY

The unpalatable dilemma facing Ministers Lambsdorff and Stoltenberg

"[...]'s get cracking," said Helmut Kohl on becoming Chancellor. His [...]omic Affairs Minister, Count Otto [...]sdorff, is itching to do exactly [...]

[...] problem is where to start. Nor[...] Lambsdorff is not at a loss for [...]ing to say, but he is at the mo[...]

[...] author of the paper which direct[...]to the break-up of the SPD/FDP [...]ion would like to keep making [...]ing cutbacks and consolidate the [...]. He would like particularly to [...] costly social welfare benefits.

[...], because of the nation's depres[...]conomy, he must be not be too [...]. He can't afford to make the [...]y save too hard and antagonise [...]ectorate. But is seems that he will [...] difficult to avoid some cuts.

[...]he opts for the generous approach, [...]ing that is now likely will beco[...]evitable: the first centre-right go[...]ent after 13 years of SPD/FDP [...]will come up with a record annual [...] deficit of well over DM40bn.

[...]d wedged between these two un[...]able possibilities there is a key [...] 6 March 1983 when the nation [...] allegedly — be called upon to [...] a new parliament.

‘Fear that business will delay investment until the March election’

[...] of the things that makes this date [...]orisome for Count Lambsdorff is [...] business might delay investment [...] of the fear that this coalition [...] voted out.

[...] "new beginning" which Lambsdorff has pursued more avidly than [...] else in his party is in danger of [...]ing into a flop.

[...] is now talk of zero growth next [...] while Lambsdorff, as recently as [...], forecast a three per cent [...]. During the coalition talks he [...] this down to 1.5 per cent.

[...] point is that, since 1982 is certain [...] with a negative growth figure, it [...] take a two per cent growth next [...] to achieve zero growth. This is how [...]tical economic data can be and [...] difficult it can be to convert them [...] policy.

[...] growth would mean an additio[...] of tax revenues of DM6bn. But [...]ing would be higher — primarily [...] the cost of unemployment [...] be very much higher than assu[...]. The new coalition has operated on [...]timistic assumption of 2.2 million [...] next year.

[...] things stand, Lambsdorff will [...] press for a reduction of unem[...]ent benefits for the first three [...] to half the last net pay, as sug[...] in his paper, even before the 6 [...] election. But this stands no [...]

[...] problems will naturally also be [...]blems of Finance Minister Ger[...] Stoltenberg. Like Lambsdorff with [...] growth forecast, Stoltenberg will [...] to review his austerity plans. This [...]ity with events in the previous [...]ment should be noted without



malice. After all, the times are as bad now as they were then.

But Stoltenberg can at least point to the fact that a coalition paper jotted down at night is no draft budget.

The draft budget, the first piece of work of the Finance Ministry under its new head, will be a bitter pill for all. Before it is finalised, the government will once more have to usher in a new austerity and reshaping round in which the cutbacks in unemployment benefits will be only one of many changes — an unenviable job just before an election.

Stoltenberg will have to demonstrate that he does not only want to save but also to reshape. And of public sector budgets must include more investment spending.

Much of what he has said so far indicates that Stoltenberg has grasped the need for such a budgetary shift.

But former finance ministers — especially Hans Matthöfer — also knew that the state can secure the survival of the economy only through stepped up investment. However, all these ministers had a tough time translating this into action.

Stoltenberg will have to work closely with Norbert Blüm, the new Labour and Social Affairs Minister, an intellectually more flexible man than his predecessor, Heinz Westphal.

This might make it easier to convince him of the need for cutbacks and streamlining. It also to some extent justifies the hope for a more imaginative social affairs policy.

Even so, it will not be easy to collect a few billion from his ministry. In any event, we shall soon know more: The talks on cutbacks in employment benefits are imminent.

There is yet another sector where the dramatic deterioration of the economic situation will hit Blüm's ministry: the Social Security Pensions Fund could find itself out of money as early as next year.

But higher contributions by the working population have been agreed on for the year thereafter.

This means that Blüm will soon have to ask Stoltenberg for more money — money which he will probably only get of he reciprocates with proportionate cutbacks in social benefits.

The financial problems of the Pensions Fund will also mean that Blüm will have to jettison his dream of a progressive pensions reform for 1984, and this would include the "baby year" (or perhaps even five "baby years") Blüm enthused about only a short while ago.

Blüm has already intimated what, if anything, is likely to become of his vaunted 1984 reform: a somewhat improved position for male next-of-kin of deceased — and a third-class funeral for all the rest.

Blüm's capabilities would therefore have to be applied to other projects such as the controversial continued payment of wages and salaries in case of illness.

Though the subject of no-pay days has long been dropped (and is not even mentioned in the Lambsdorff paper) Blüm nevertheless intends to correct one of the worst mistakes of post-war social policy — a mistake that has been detrimental to employment: continued payment of wages and salaries by the employer. He wants this pay to come from the authority it should have come from in the first place, i. e. the social security system.

The new housing minister, Oscar Schneider — an expert in his field — could have as much of an impact as Blüm on the consolidation of Bonn finances.

Oscar Schneider could play a major role in the new cabinet inasmuch as the money resulting from the "compulsory interest-free loan to the government" to be imposed on higher earniers will be used in the housing sector.

This would include the envisaged subsidising of new construction through bridging finance and the tax deductibility of all interest charges in connection with the construction of private homes.

In addition, tenancy laws will be liberalised to an extent the SPD would never have allowed in the previous government.

Liberalisation in this context would mean that lessors who frequently suffered losses in the construction of new housing would now be able to charge higher rents which, it is hoped, would encourage them to build more.

Schneider expects his programme to result in the construction of 50,000 additional housing units a year and provide jobs for 100,000.

Werner Dollinger, the new Transport Minister, could also create additional jobs, though the joy over this fact is dimmed by the fact that this includes the senseless Rhine-Main-Danube Canal.

Dollinger is one of those members of Kohl's team who has held cabinet posts before.

Though for barely a month, he was development aid minister in the Erhard cabinet until the FDP withdrew its ministers in 1966.

‘Joy dimmed by the thought of the senseless Rhine, Main, Danube Canal’

He also gathered ministerial experience in the Finance Ministry and the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

There can be no doubt that Dollinger will be a competent Transport Minister. Unfortunately, however, he will be unable to stop the completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal which his predecessor, Volker Hauff, called the most stupid project since the Tower of Babel.

CSU leader Franz Josef Strauss made the costly completion of the canal one of his conditions in the coalition talks. Here, Finance Minister Stoltenberg and Economic Affairs Minister Lambsdorff must have acted as if the state coffers were brimming over.

Considering a budget deficit of DM50bn, it hardly matters if the old government is blamed for an extra billion.

Research Minister Heinz Riesenhuber will also have to deal with a controversial project worth billions.

(The Munzinger Press Archives describes him as "one of the most brilliant CDU/CSU minds in the fields of research and technology.")

This accolade is relative: expertise in this field is a rarity in Bonn.

But even if this were not so, Riesenhuber would still stand out. He is a scientist and therefore knows what he is talking about. Moreover, as a former executive of a major company he is familiar with the practical effects of state promotion of research and development.

Two major projects — the fast breeder reactor in Kalkar and the high temperature reactor in Schmeehausen — are on razor's edge due to financing deficits of between DM3.5bn and DM4bn.

Up to now, Riesenhuber has need determined to continue both projects because he considers it intolerable to forgo such technologies. But his DM7bn budget is inadequate to cover the financing gap of the next few years. As a result, industry has been called upon to jump into the breach.

‘Blüm will have to jettison dreams of pension reforms in 1984’

This suits the new minister just fine since he has always held that — especially with major projects — private business should bear as much of the financing responsibility as possible.

It will be intersting to see how industry, especially the utilities, which refused to go along with the same proposal from Riesenhuber's predecessor von Bülow, will react towards the new government.

If the new man is given a chance to hold his office for more then just a few months, research policy in this country could change drastically.

Riesenhuber mistrusts the research bureaucracy, and he does not believe that bureaucrats know better than industry what is needed in this field.

For the state promotion of research this would mean less direct and more indirect project promotion through such instruments as tax relief and lump sum subsidies. The state would no longer tell industry in which field to do its research but only to get on with it.

But all this will take its time because old obligations have to be met first. As a result, there will be no swift change in our research policy.

The position in the Post and Telecommunications Ministry, headed by the Hesse entrepreneur Christian Schwarz-Schilling, is quite different. There will be more changes here than in any other department of Kohl's government.

Schwarz-Schilling has always questioned the postal authority's telecommunications monopoly. It would therefore be no more than consistent if he were now to do away with it; and he has the parliamentary majority needed for it.

In reality, however, Schwarz-Schilling will probably soon realise how lovely it is to have such a powerful instrument as the telecommunications monopoly to play with. No minister holding this portfolio will voluntarily surrender this instrument.

But there is one thing he will demonstrate: how to implement and ope-

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■ THE ECONOMY

Operation number one: repairing the budget

It was mainly economic policy that brought down the Schmidt-Genscher government. So the Kohl-Genscher government will have to give priority to working out the budget.

When he took office, the new Finance Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg, spoke of a "disastrous legacy". He did not exaggerate.

In view of still bleak economic prospects and many budgetary risks, the DM50bn deficit for 1983 Stoltenberg spoke of could well happen.

The old government anticipated a deficit of DM28bn. But in doing so it clearly had its head in the sand.

At the very worst moment, when the country finds itself in the worst economic crisis of the post-war era, the excessive deficit policy of the past few years has stripped the government of scope for action. It will have to do something decisive.

The new government is faced with the almost insoluble dual task of stimulating economic growth on the one hand and incisively reducing structural budgetary deficits on the other.

The sins of the past have come home to roost. For more than a decade, politicians found it more important to satisfy consumer needs instead of boosting investment.

This must be changed. But can this be expected of a government that has assumed office under such difficult conditions?

The conservatives and the FDP have themselves contributed towards the high expectations that are now placed in them. They have promised to reduce the government's new debt and to put the social security system on a sound footing. By the same token, they always rejected tax increases as a means of overcoming the crisis. But it has become obvious today that these objectives cannot be reached in the short term.

This is not surprising because it is impossible to rectify the mismanagement of many years within a few months.

For instance: it is impossible to cut back on next year's spending by say, DM10bn more than the cutbacks already envisaged by the old government — if for no other reason, than lack of time. The government would have no more than eight weeks in which to draft the new budget and get the necessary laws through parliament.

The economic turning point can only be achieved in several stages. What matters initially is to make the figures of the budget coincide with reality, to make few but effective consolidation decisions and to provide a few additional boosts for growth.

There can be no doubt that the coalition paper points in that direction, which makes the new coalition look better than the old one.

The consolidation policy must, however, continue steadfastly during the next year. So far, the coalition programme promises no more than a new beginning.

If the new coalition partners actually succeed in postponing all pension increases by six months, in restricting public sector salaries, reforming education and training allowances and liberalising the housing market, there is no reason to doubt that they will continue along this path.

There can be no overlooking the fact that the new government concept contains some inconsistencies. There is, for instance, the intention to increase VAT at an inopportune moment.

The trouble is that not increasing VAT would mean either drastically cutting on spending or record borrowing. So all that remains is to choose between a number of evils.

In any event, it would already be a success if the government managed to keep the 1983 debt below that of the current year.

The "compulsory, interest-free loan to the government" for higher earners is more than just a minor blemish.

Such proposals are designed to dispel the contention that all the burdens are put on the man-in-the-street and that the well-to-do are being treated with kid gloves.

This sort of policy is understandable, but it won't get us any further. In any event, it will not spare the government a head-on clash with trade union leaders.

The new government must try to convince the public by pursuing a consistent policy — and this won't be easy.

It was not only opportunism when Helmut Schmidt and his Finance Minister, Manfred Lahnstein, spoke of a "change towards an elbow society and social unrest." They also gave an indication of the storm those will have to face who tackle the job of overcoming the economic crisis and financial debacle and putting social benefits in line with the financial possibilities.

Anybody who calls this a "social dismantlement" acts irresponsibly. If Kohl and Genscher's efforts fail, we would be faced with either financial anarchy or a grand coalition. Neither is desirable.

Walter Kannengiesser

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 1 October 1982)

Pensioners wi[ll] probably be hardest hit

The change of government in B[onn] means that millions of pensio[ners] rent-payers, welfare recipients [and] jobless will have to tighten their [belts] still further. They have already b[orne] the brunt of the previous governm[ent's] austerity measures.

For the first time now, the bluep[rint] of the new centre-right government provides for sacrifices by civil serv[ants] and the well-to-do in its bid to cr[eate] jobs.

The true effects of the austerity [mea]sures agreed on by CDU/CSU [and] FDP will not be fully known, how[ever,] until the bills relating to the new bu[dget] have been tabled in the Bundestag.

The nation's 13 million pensio[ners] are again expected to bear the heav[iest] burden. The postponement by [six] months of the pensions increases [will] mean that, averaged out over the y[ear,] the increase will be 2.8 per cent inst[ead] of 5.6 per cent.

Another half of a percentage p[oint] will be lost by the pensioners' contri[bu]tion (as of mid-1983) to their health [in]surance. Pensioners will be left wi[th an] increase of only 2.3 per cent while [the] cost of living will go up by about [...] per cent.

The postponed pensions increase means that further pension incre[ases] until 1985 will be lower than usual. [Ex]perts say that the decline of pens[ions] will amount to seven per cent by [the] middle of the decade.

But the two million or so welfare [re]cipients will be hit even worse. Their [al]ready low benefits are likely to be p[ushed] down still further.

The increase of welfare payments [will] also be postponed until the middl[e of] next year and then it will be two ins[tead] of three per cent. Taking the los[s of] buying power into account, welfare [re]cipients will have to manage on [...] per cent less than before.

A look at the "basket of goods" [the] lawmakers are allocating to we[lfare] budgets shows that this group of [the] public already lives at subsistence le[vel:] a welfare recipient is entitled to h[alf a] cinema ticket a month and to 20 [min]utes worth of electric light a day.

The standard 1981 monthly we[lfare] rate for a couple was DM782.12 [plus] rent.

Close to 600 households — man[y of] them old people — depend entirely [on] welfare. To make matters worse, [wel]fare recipients — along with the re[st of] the population — will have to pay [more] VAT from the middle of 1983.

According to Finance Ministry [fig]ures, the tax increase will put an a[ddi]tional monthly cost of DM6 on a [two-]people pensioners' household [and] DM15 on a four-people employ[ee] household in a medium income bra[cket.] In addition, the change in rent laws [will] cost the consumer more.

The envisaged restriction of civil [ser]vice pay increases to two per cent [from] July 1983 will be interpreted as a s[ignal] for the forthcoming round of colle[ctive] bargaining and will strengthen the [posi]tion of private employers, meaning [that] the mass of employees will have to [ex]pect very moderate pay increases.

Those in the higher income catego[ries] will now have to bear some of co[sts]

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Labour's despondency over the exit of the old government is as lukewarm as management's rejoicing over the entry of the new one.

The trade unions' response boils down to a warning to the new government to maintain the welfare state. Management are giving a general advance payment in terms of confidence.

This conspicuous lack of emotion indicates that neither group wants to worsen the atmosphere.

"Social peace" is seen as one of the most important production factors of German industry — though labour and management differ in the definition of the term.

Neither has as yet come up with a definitive interpretation of "social peace."

The initial economic and fiscal programme of the centre-right cabinet could have provided both groups with enough reasons for protest.

Business could have pointed to a number of inconsistencies, such as higher taxes and levies in the form of the envisaged "compulsory loan to the government" and the wishy-washiness of social policy.

Even so, business has not articulated its objections because it regards the Kohl-Genscher government as a guarantee in the medium term of a climate of faith in the market economy.

And some trade unionists are perhaps relieved about the fact that "their" SPD can now devote itself once more to fully promoting the interests of the working class without having to accommodate a coalition partner.

A welcome, but little ecstasy, for new team

But be this as it may, the trade unions will have to deal with the new government and they will somehow have to get along with it — especially considering that 40 per cent of their members vote conservative.

Rational union leaders are probably aware that the new government in Bonn has already met them half way. It has not done three things that the old government might well have got around to doing: reducing unemployment benefits, restricting the continued payment of wages and salaries in case of sickness and reducing or doing away with paid maternity leave.

This is a clear gesture of peace towards the trade unions and a sacrifice in terms of economic common sense — a price that has never yet ensured social peace.

The business community pins its hopes on the Ministers for Economic Affairs and Finance: Count Lambsdorff and Gerhard Stoltenberg. Both are seen as guarantors of common sense, expertise and dependability.

Labour Minister Norbert Blüm, a former trade unionist, began his term of office with the right approach when he coined the phrase "a breathing space for the welfare state." Of course, the task of working out details is still ahead of him. But this coolly rational approach will be hard to get across.

There are five months of election campaigning ahead and the metalworkers' accusation of an "attack on the social state" and "neo-conservative march towards a state of entrepreneurs" is only the beginning of the campaign.

Ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt dipped into his arsenal of poison when he said that the new coalition scoffed at the constitutional provision of Germany as a welfare state and was heading towards an "elbow society."

This makes it necessary to stress two basic facts: the biggest danger to social peace lies in the millions of unemployed and the second biggest in a welfare state we can no longer pay for.

It is not those who introduce cutbacks here or there who act in a socially unbalanced way but those who minimise the problems or aggravate them by doing nothing.

Statecraft does not mean creating a welfare state in times of a booming economy by distributing the bounty and making promises; it means preserving this social state in times of crisis.

It is on this that the old government foundered and it is this that will become the acid test for the new government — a test of expertise versus lip service.

Even if it might not look this way at the moment, such an approach could strengthen social peace.

Peter Gillies

(Die Welt, 6 October 1982)

LABOUR

Optimism the first step to cutting the length of the dole queues

[This a]rticle was written for *Rheinischer [Merkur]/Christ und Welt* by Josef Stingl, [head] of the Federal Labour Office in [Nürn]berg.

[Une]mployment is the burning politi[ca]l issue of the moment. Some have [hoped th]at the depressing length of the [dole q]ueues can be reduced swiftly.

[The t]rouble is that these hopes could [soon] become despair. I'm afraid that [they m]ust remain an illusion. People [compa]re today's 1.8m unemployed with [those] in the 1950s, but this is only an [arithm]etical similarity.

[Then], the economy was on the [thresh]old of a sustained growth phase [and,] therefore, growing employment. [Today] it is uncertain if there will be any [growth] at all.

[It is] clear that the problem cannot be [solv]ed from one day to the next. All [that c]an be expected is that economic [polici]es set the right course. They must [encour]age optimism. Only if the mood [of gloo]m is overcome can the problem [itself be] overcome.

[The] first step is to eliminate the shor[tage o]f jobs. Now there are 18 jobless [queu]ing for each place. To do this, [the gro]wth rate would have to exceed 4 [per ce]nt for several years. That means [inv]estment promotion is essential.

[The e]mphasis must be on technology [and inn]ovation. They are essential if an [econom]y which is so dependent on ex[ports i]s to remain internationally com[petitive].

[In a]ddition, the trend towards a pure [welfa]re state must be checked. None of [the pa]rties in the Bundestag really want [it to] continue.

Individual responsibility and initiative must be encouraged and scrounging must be fought. Development of the of social benefits system has helped breed this attitude.

For example, the bickering over what job is suitable and which is not. There are people who pretend at the Labour Office that they are prepared to work. But they aren't.

Laws to encourage work must be backed up by an attitude of self help where self help is possible, so long as people don't suffer undue hardship.

But the unemployment insurance system should stay as it is and the benefits should not be reduced. Almost half of all people drawing dole money depend entirely on it.

Average unemployment pay is DM1,000 a month. Any reduction at all, especially for the family breadwinner, would mean a drop below subsistence level. Then the whole family would be forced to apply for welfare assistance.

Our unemployment insurance system rests on the principle that those who have work must help finance the livelihood of those who are temporarily out of work. And anybody calling for an across-the-board reduction of unemployment benefits would jeopardise this principle.

In addition to general economic and fiscal measures, we need an active labour market policy — preferably more active than we have had up to now.

Without such a policy, our annual average unemployment would be about a quarter of a million higher.

In the long run, the Federal Labour Office should not spend the bulk of its money on unemployment benefits but on measures to promote employment.

By making our system of contributions to unemployment insurance more flexible we would enlarge our scope of action for job creating measures.

I could, for instance, well imagine legislators giving the Labour Office enough unemployment insurance contributions and leaving it to the office's board to decide how to use them in prevailing conditions.

This would mean that measures under the work promotion law could be financed exclusively from unemployment insurance contributions and would therefore impose no burden on the taxpayer because no federal grants would be needed.

I also consider it necessary to arrive at a better coordination between the education authorities and labour market policy makers in removing structural employment problems.

What I mean is not an educational policy that will orientate itself by the requirements of the labour market at the moment (which would violate the Constitution anyway). I do, however, think that we should depart from a policy that favours university education. Instead, we should put more emphasis on promoting vocational schools, on-the-job training and institutions providing courses for further vocational education.

Here, companies that train apprentices have a particular social responsibility. They will have to continue to make an all-out effort to provide apprenticeships for the high birth-rate generation school leavers in the next few years.

As of the late 1980s, it will be the low birth rate generation that will be leaving the schools, with the attendant shortage of skilled workers. Medium-term plans mut now already ensure that no labour bottleneck occurs when this happens.

We also need some clear-cut decisions on aliens policy. Despite the freeze on the hiring of foreign workers that has been in effect since 1973, there are some two million working foreigners here. The total foreign population has reached a peak of 4.6m.

Present laws governing the immigration of the next-of-kin of these people would permit an additional 800,000 relatives to come here. After a specific waiting time, these people become entitled to a work permit.

This means that we are importing additional unemployment. And this, in its turn, would fuel the already widespread xenophobia that has resulted from present economic and social conditions.

In the interest of the community as a whole, I therefore consider it essential to integrate those foreigners who have lived here for many years. The lower the immigration, the easier this will be.

In addition, foreigners who are prepared to go home should be helped. There are several ways in which this can be done.

A humane and hence meaningful aliens policy would be to step up efforts to take machines to the people rather than vice versa. This kind of development aid policy would also have the advantage of providing improved markets for our own industry.

But I must warn all those who want to solve our unemployment problems by deporting foreign workers and their families. Our morality must not be guided by the whims of the economy. There are still many branches of industry that depend on foreign labour.

As a supporting measure, earlier retirement and shorter hours can also help to reduce joblessness. Labour Office now helps to finance short shift work.

But there are still many other possibilities of making our rigid system of working times more flexible.

However, efforts to reduce working hours and working lives must not be allowed to lead to laws or regulations that would restrict individual freedoms. In other words, 63-year-olds mut continue to have the option to go on working. By the same token, those who want to retire earlier should be able to do so.

In tht case, they would have to be prepared to accept a lesser pension.

The cost aspect that governs the competitiveness of industry must never be lost sight of when it comes to shorter working hours. We must also realise that there is no direct proportion between shorter working hours and new jobs.

In contemplating shorter working hours we should think of the 1.8 million people whose working times have been shortened by 100 per cent, that is, the unemployed themselves. *Josef Stingl*

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 1 October 1982)

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[a]usterity drive. A compulsory [interest]-free loan to the government at [a rat]e of five per cent of tax owed will [hit s]ingle people earning over [DM50,0]00 p.a. and couples with in[comes] of over DM100,000 p.a. (In both [cases t]his means taxable income).

[The] loans are to be repaid after three [years.] These provisions would affect [some] 1.4 million taxpayers.

[It] remains to be seen how many [of the]m will in fact make these loans to [the gov]ernment. The blueprint provides [exem]ptions for those who invest five [times] this amount. By the same token, [this gro]up is earmarked as the main be[neficia]ry of the many tax relief provi[sions] aimed at stimulating investment.

[Fami]lies with fairly high earnings are [hi]t in yet another way. Couples [with tw]o children and a net income of [DM50,]000 or more will have the child [allowan]ce for the second child cut from [DM100] to DM80. For the third child, [they w]ill be getting DM150 instead of [DM220]; and for every further child, [DM2]00 instead of DM240.

[But] from the third child onward the [income] limit rises by DM7,800 per [year.] Child allowances for all income [groups] were but by DM20 for the se[cond] and third child at the beginning of [the] year.

[The] new coalition intends to rush [the] provisions through parliament.

Günther Olthof

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 1 October 1982)

The dilemma

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rate information and communication technologies.

If he remains faithful to himself, Schwarz-Schilling will lift the blockade of these technologies. In other words: the postal authority will proceed with the work necessary for the introduction of cable TV.

But since the postal authority's planned well ahead of time there is not much scope for investment shifts. And there is no chance whatsoever of getting as much as a pfennig from the federal budget. So if Schwarz-Schilling wants to go ahead he will have to resort to money markets or call on private industry to become involved.

Potential private media operators who have always deplored the Postal Authority's restrictive attitude will now have to put up or shut up.

Says Schwarz-Schilling: "We have no choice but to introduce the new sophisticated technologies in this country as quickly as possible. Only then will we be in a position to keep a balanced structure of small, medium sized and large companies going — and this is the only way of restoring full employment in this country."

The course the new development aid minister, Jürgen Warnker, will steer is much harder to predict.

Warnke, a CSU MP and an executive of the Ceramics Industry Association, must have considered all sorts of posts except that of development aid minister. The fact is that he has never concerned himself with development aid.

But having ten years ago produced his apprentice piece (in the form of the *Zonenrandförderungsgesetz* for the promotion of areas along the East German border), he might well now produce his masterpiece.

One of the possible instruments here could be generous tax relief for those investing in the Third World — a move that is bound to please industry.

In any event, there will certainly be a change in Germany's development policy and aid will be concentrated on countries close to the West — an old CSU demand.

Dieter Piel/Wolfgang Hoffmann

(Die Zeit, 8 October 1982)

Bonn's team

Continued from page 3

filiations) politicians like Anton Pfeifer, Dieter Schulte and Volkmar Köhler had to make do with second-grade posts while others were given portfolios.

The CSU's Friedrich Zimmermann (Interior) is the most controversial figure. But he should now be given a chance to be measured by the future rather than by rhetoric from the past.

Another weak point is the exclusion of Franz Josef Strauss (CSU), the Bavarian Prime Minister.

He hasn't taken his exclusion well, and his attacks have somewhat damaged the image and cohesion of the new coalition.

This could change after next spring's national elections when the Cabinet will have to be reviewed.

Strauss is right on one point: next year, Helmut Schmidt's jobless will be those of Helmut Kohl. And the new Opposition knows it. *Friedhelm Fiedler*

(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 7 October 1982)

■ PERSPECTIVE

The growing gap between getting and giving in a changing world

The writer, Dr Meinhard Miegel, is director of the Institute of Economic and Social Policy, Bonn.

Comparison of recent election results in Western democracies reveals that in the overwhelming majority of cases the party in power has been replaced by the Opposition.

This is what last happened in the United States, in Britain, France, Denmark, Sweden and now in Germany. Yet there is no clear political trend apparent.

Where left-wing governments held power, as in America, Britain or Denmark, they were replaced by governments of the right (relatively speaking).

Where right-wingers held power, as in France or Sweden, their place was taken by left-wingers.

Voters evidently felt it was more important to have a change of government than to switch allegiance in any specific direction.

It has been most unusual for issues of domestic or external security, foreign affairs, education or the arts to play any significant part in election campaigns.

Voters are even prepared to disregard more or less substantial shortcomings on the part of their political leaders. But there is one unpardonable sin they are not prepared to forgive.

❛ Society can take the easy option . . . and with it 20 per cent unemployment ❜

It is the inability of governments to close the growing gap between what people expect the government to do for them and what they are prepared to give in return.

This is the dilemma and the paradox facing all democratic industrialised countries, including Japan and Switzerland.

Individual and collective readiness to give are marking time, whereas individual and collective welfare claims are increasing almost unabatedly.

Minorities alone are really consistent. They alone are unreservedly prepared to deliver the goods needed to ensure that their high expectations can be met.

They alone are prepared to voluntarily scale down expectations provided they are then not expected to chip in too much. The majority invariably asks for a little more than it is prepared to give.

Views may differ on whether this attitude is natural. What matters more is that it has lately emerged as a crucial factor in economic, social and political life.

People are, in a way, rebelling against themselves. They expect society and the government to provide services and facilities which, in the final analysis, they themselves alone can provide.

Disillusionment and disappointment are thus a foregone conclusion.

An argument frequently advanced is that governments have spoilt the people. Regardless whether or not their promises were politicially feasible they are said to have promised voters full employment, high incomes, student grants and pensions, blue skies and unpolluted rivers.

And all these services were to be provided for next to nothing. Governments chose not to mention that they all had their price: a high degree of individual and social commitment and hard work.

Fairly though such accusations may be levelled at political leaders, they can only be given half the blame. The other half must be laid fairly and squarely at the door of people who vote for parties and politicians who promise them the impossible.

Voters are beguiled by promises of getting just a little more than they are prepared to give. Nowhere can it be said with greater truth that democracies get the governments they deserve.

Little perspicacity is needed to realise that readiness to give something in return for what you get, let alone to make sacrifices, has declined perceptibly in the industrialised West.

This trend is clearly evident in quantitative terms. Company executives are steadily less willing to work their fingers to the bone for the firm.

The self-employed are keen to take several weeks' holiday undisturbed, like everyone else. Salary-earners jealously guard a weekend that often begins on Friday afternoon.

Tradesmen, such as electricians or plumbers, are seldom available on Saturdays. And as for the occasional hour of overtime, it is increasingly felt to be an unreasonable demand.

But the qualitative decline is even more drastic than the quantitative one. Readiness to give of one's best when and wherever it is required is for many a virtue to be read about rather than practised.

Those who are not prepared to come to terms with the fact that industrial products and the work of tradesmen are often faulty are increasingly at odds with their environment.

The same is true of those who refuse to accept what is frequently abysmal service in hospitals, hotels and restaurants or the poor quality of university lectures or expert surveys and assessments.

A society that takes the easy way out can undeniably survive. It can enjoy long holidays and long weekends. It can refuse to travel long distances to work or to consider job mobility and vocational training.

It can make do with second best and let standards slip. It can set aside, as the Greens, or environmentalists, have done, all ideas of careers, performance and competition.

It can do all that and much more and no-one can deny that life along these lines has its advantages.

But a society that decides in favour of this option cannot afford to regard 10 or 20 per cent unemployment and earnings that stagnate or decline as a catastrophe.

It cannot object to housing looking a little more down-at-heel and roads needing mending, trains breaking down now and again, water supplies being interrupted or the latest equipment not being available in the operating theatre.

These are part and parcel of a society that prefers to take it easy.

Few governments have so far sought to reduce the growing discrepancy between what people expect from society and what they are prepared to give in return.

Nearly all have preferred to look on while wage talks have taken their annual toll even though there were no profits or productivity gains to share out.

They have allowed people who were able and willing to deliver the goods to be stylised at school and in the media as anti-heroes: mindless, heartless and soulless.

They have come to accept performance, in terms of both mind and matter, being steadily less worthwhile, whereas mere clamouring for service and attention, preferably organised and vociferous, increasingly paid.

It took long for the growing tension between giving and taking to come to a head. Until well into the 1970s governments that denied it existed, or ignored it, were in tune with a majority of voters.

Doubts as to whether this is the right approach have only lately looked as though they might command majority support.

We can certainly no longer shirk the choice. We must either give more or be prepared to get less.

We can be less sure than many might imagine which of the two options be preferred. But for the time be- looks as though demands are con- not to say on the increase.

Attempts to scale down claims rights (in the widest sense of the would be sure to encounter embi- majority resistance the moment prehensive collective security sys were no longer guaranteed.

There would likewise be an upro the right to work were no longer p- cally acknowledged.

The only social and political resp that can possibly be made to this of affairs is to step up performance give so as to be able to get.

That is easier said than done. It very well to boost companies' ca base, to reduce red tape, to restore fidence in politics and to foster an mistic view of the future.

But to believe that these moves would permanently improve the ingness of the general public to giv ther than to get is to take too simp view of the world and of the tasks to faced.

A policy aimed at striking a bal between the two in the conditions of 1980s must be based on the follow assumptions.

❛ People are rebelling against themselves . . . with what they expect from the state ❜

● Society today is not straining at leash to perform, which it was 20 o years ago.

By virtue of relative prosperity saturation it has an attitude toward formance that differs from that of post-war generation.

● Readiness to perform, or to especially the readiness to innova run risks, is anything but a matte course.

So easing pressure on the brakes not be enough. This readiness mus carefully tended and nurtured, by p ticians among others.

● Not everyone who is ready to form is able to do so directly. Most p ple are dependent on others taking their offer of labour and putting good use.

Readiness of the majority to gi not enough. It can easily come to ing if these others, the minority, ar prepared to take them up on the off

● The innovative, dynamic min are critical, wide-awake, deman and relatively independent.

Great skill is needed to gain political support and to motivate t Purely material incentives are enough.

● Motivating the minority for good of all may not be everything without the support of the min nothing will work.

The gap between giving and ge cannot be bridged unless dynamic innovative social forces, be they mers, skilled workmen, salaries civil servants, self-employed and are motivated.

● A policy that meets these req ments is not easy, and it is even difficult to muster and maintain ma ty support for it.

But a policy that fails to meet requirements is doomed to failure fore it has even begun.

Dr Meinhard Mie

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und 1 October

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INDUSTRY

Shipbuilding in troubled waters: German yards stumble over foreign competition

amburg and Bremen are worried by the threat of further shipyard ndancies in an industry that used the port cities' pride and joy.

pping and trade have always been commercial groundwork on the and the Weser; shipbuilding was industrial bedrock.

ur items of bad news have made furrow in ever greater gloom:

he board of directors at Blohm & have decided to sack 500 men out otal of 6,200 in Hamburg.

t AG Weser, the Bremen shipyard, payroll is to be thinned out by 150.

owaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, of and Hamburg, look likely to sack men in Hamburg in an imminent e-up.

remer Vulkan must not only sack f its 4,350 staff and cut the piece s of remaining men. The company is having to ask shareholders to chip ore capital.

They're not just figures," said Heinz er of IG Metall, the engineering ers' union, at a Bremer Vulkan s meeting.

These are people, workmates of whose families are being driven to the brink of despair."

He assured the meeting that as a ber of the company's supervisory d he would call on the board of directors to cancel the sackings.

So did staff representatives at other yards, while Fritz Bettelhäuser, s council chairman at Bremer Vulkan, even went so far as to say, on local "Either we all go or no-one

e may be nearer the truth than he ines. A top-secret Bremen shipyard ey leaves little doubt that Vulkan's es have been exhausted. The yard tually bankrupt.

Norbert Henke, the new managing tor, hotly disagrees:

I haven't seen the survey yet but I r Vulkan. We're not broke, we're in financial difficulties. That is why re having to streamline the company under pressure."

e felt time was so short that he not to wait until the survey was . (It was commissioned early this by Thyssen-Bornemisza and , who own the two leading Bre yards, and the city's Senate at a of DM1.5m.)

He went ahead in total disregard of agreements," IG Metall officials plain. They wanted to discuss at lei the conclusions reched by management consultants Knight Wegenstein after months of analysis.

The survey outlines several proposals could be the deliverance of Bre s shipyard:

irst, everything stays the way it is. Weser, with a yard in Bremen and r in Bremerhaven, and Vulkan in independent.

econd, AG Weser and Bremer Vul merge, but the merger does not in e Seebeck, AG Weser's profit-mak Bremerhaven subsidiary.

hird, AG Weser, Vulkan and See remain formally independent but forces in a holding company.

ther plans, including proposals to e all the city's shipyards, have been ed, partly in view of how HDW fared.

"Howaldtswerke in Kiel and Deutsche Werft in Hamburg have been in the throes of a merger for years," a Bonn politician noted recently.

"They are the most off-putting example one could possibly imagine of a technical merger. The end of the saga looks like being that the Hamburg division of HDW will have to shut down completely."

The proposal Bremen experts now uniformly favour is an improved version of the status quo. It would entail the following moves:

● Bremer Vulkan would have to sack 153 shipyard workers and 452 clerical staff.

● AG Weser would have to sack 215 white-collar workers but could hire an extra 194 shipbuilding workers.

● Seebeck would have to sack 62 clerical workers but could hire 64 shipyard workers.

What this plan amounts to, as Norbert Henke puts it, is "work more and save more." Administrative and extraneous costs must be cut to the bone and the savings ploughed into urgent and essential investment.

The aim of this shake-up is to enable the city's shipyards to be able to bid for tenders at competitive prices, which is easier said than done.

The prices charged for an hour's work by shipyards in world markets are in the region of DM47 (and not over DM50, as the survey says).

But West German shipyards are much more expensive. Seebeck are said in the survey to charge DM53.90 an hour, Bremer Vulkan DM62 and AG Weser DM75 per man hour of shipbuilding work.

Overhead costs must be slashed if they are to be able to charge less, and as Norbert Henke says: "To cut overheads you just cannot avoid sacking staff."

At his company, Bremer Vulkan, overheads total about DM200m a year, including DM150m in wage bills.

But works councils at all shipyards are strictly opposed to any more staff cuts. Works council chairman Karl Schreyer of Blohm & Voss in Hamburg has already stated:

"Redundancies are unnecessary at Blohm & Voss. Orders will keep us busy until 1983. Short time working for all is all that is needed."

Fritz Bettelhäuser of Bremer Vulkan has similar proposals as an alternative to his management's plans to sack 500.

The package he suggests includes short time working, natural wastage and a maximum of 120 apprentices a year (with the company undertaking to keep on 50 per cent once they have learnt the trade(.

Former blue collar workmen who have transferred to clerical trades will be allowed to transfer back. Staff will be retrained to improve the quality of workmanship and to reduce reliance on outside contractors.

The last two points in Bettelhäuser's package are an overtime ban and a total ban on new hirings.

What is more, the Vulkan works council says (and others agree), it is high time workers under contract hire were sent packing.

"Mass dismissals are intolerable," Bettelhäuser says, "when you know that over 2,000 men work under contract hire at Vulkan alone.

"Their work could be done better by our own workmates."

AG Weser's works chairman Hans Ziegenfuss says about 600 men at his company's yard are labour under contract hire. "We don't really need them," he claims.

His shipyard has been through the most harrowing cuts of them all so far. In 1975 it employed over 5,000; now its payroll is down to 2,300.

AG Weser are over the hill and hope to be internationally competitive again this year and to end 1982 with company accounts in the black.

But that only partially gratifies shipbuilders on the Elbe and the Weser. They are all worried that what Herr Schönberger, a Vulkan works councillor, told his workmates recently might come true.

"In 1978," he said, "there were 80,000 shipyard workers in the Federal Republic of Germany. Now there are only 50,000. If the trend continues shipbuilding will soon no longer matter."

Crisis loomed in 1975 at the latest. In the early 1970s shipbuilding orders plummeted after years of continual expansion.

Crisis came in the wake of the oil embargo, which was followed by the collapse of the crude oil tanker market, by worldwide recession with its effects on trade and by the decline in freight rates.

At the same time up-and-coming shipbuilding countries elbowed into world markets, undercutting both European and Japanese prices.

No matter how low the Germans pitched their prices, the Koreans were invariably cheaper, and not only for less sophisticated ships.

Hapag-Lloyd, Germany's largest shipping company, has just ordered three container freighters in Korea. The Koreans were 40 per cent cheaper than German yards.

For the price the Korean asked, German yards would not even have been able to pay material and wage bills.

Bonn and the coastal *Länder* have sought time and again to offset such competition. An aid programme for the shipbuilding industry has been in force since 1962.

Over the past 20 years, Mayor Hans Koschnick of Bremen recently told the works council chairmen of Bremer Vulkan and AG Weser, Bonn government grants and low-interest loans have totalled over DM6.3bn.

Since 1965 there has also been an investment programme to help the German shipping industry. It has cost Bonn DM2.8bn.

The *Länder* have likewise backed the industry, while development aid has been reinvested in Germany in the form of orders to shipyards.

So the German taxpayer has in one way or another pumped roughly DM12bn into civilian shipbuilding.

"These figures alone," Herr Koschnick said, "show how heavily Bonn and the *Länder* hve backed the shipbuilding industry and are prepared to continue doing so."

To play down this aid, he told the works council chairmen, would be to run the risk of forfeiting future support.

In the past, yards have invariably offered, in return for aid, to specialise in sophisticated shipping and transportation systems.

Their works councils now clamour for alternative lines of production, but managements are sceptical.

Norbert Henke's long-term concept for Bremer Vulkan nonetheless includes manufacturing capacity independent of shipbuilding.

What he has in mind is mechanical engineering, more repair and maintenance work and the upkeep of naval frigates.

But if prices continue to fall, investment to make German yards more competitive and to diversify will no longer be enough.

"In this case," the authors of the Bremen survey say, "a more far-reaching structural adaptation will be needed, including substantial pruning of capacity and jobs."

Herr Henke does not take such a gloomy view of Vulkan's future. He sounds an optimistic note now he senses that his shareholders may be prepared to chip in more capital.

Meanwhile, the staff are determined to defend their jobs in any way they can. A works meeting is to be held at Bremer Vulkan to decide whether or ot to consider a lengthy strike.

There have been token stoppages on two days recently, but there are doubts whether the company could survive a long strike. "You can strike a firm stone dead," warns Herr Henke.

Bremer IG Metall officials have embarked on a new rescue bid by launching a civic action group to campaign for keeping the jobs going.

Helgard Köhne

(Die Zeit, 1 October 1982)

All at sea on land

Ships officers are now to get their advanced training in this make-believe bridge, which is claimed to be the most modern of its type in Europe. It contains all the latest equipment, and was manufactured by a Krupp subsidiary. (Photo: Krupp)

■ AEROSPACE

Scientist tells how colonising the Moon would help the Earth

A German-American rocket engineer and futurologist outlined to the international space congress in Paris detailed proposals for colonising the Moon.

The first service he envisaged Moon settlers providing for the mother planet was a space waste disposal facility for used satellites.

It would naturally be provided at a cost and run as a commercial venture.

Settlers could recycle from this technical waste valuable components and raw materials that would otherwise have to be shipped from Earth.

A lunar settlement planned to make economic sense, a Moon colony that could be financed, was described by Krafft Ehricke.

At as early a stage of lunar development as possible, he said, attempts must be made to recoup at least some of the enormous costs of settlement.

The aim must be to make the Moon a high-grade, creditworthy trading partner for the Earth.

In the long term it definitely held forth the prospect of a solution to many dilemmas mankind faced. It had the following advantages from the viewpoint of industrial development:

● The Moon has only about a sixth of the Earth's gravitational pull, which would facilitate many industrial processes and cut transport costs.

Shipments could be shot round the Moon along ballistic trajectories or sent into lunar or terrestrial orbit at a fraction of the cost from Earth.

● The lack of a lunar atmosphere would make the use of atomic energy



and a number of chemical manufacturing processes unproblematic.

The oxygen Moon settlers need could be refined from lunar rock. Initial shelters could be built in igloo fashion out of pies of lunar sand.

Even food could later be grown under cover in this way.

Ehricke has a five-stage lunar development plan. Investment would start bearing fruit from stage three, he claims.

Stage One would be to probe the Moon's natural resources from Earth, using satellites and simple unmanned exploration vehicles.

Solar reflectors could be put into lunar orbit to relay light to the Moon's polar regions, which the sunlight does not reach.

Stage Two is an orbital space station as an operation centre for further exploration and a research laboratory for experiments with manufacturing processes and trials of crop plants envisaged.

Once the scientific groundwork for a settlement has been laid, Stage Three, the first productive stage, could begin with the construction of a nuclear power station on the surface of the Moon.

It would supply the energy with which to construct the first protective buildings made of readily and amply accessible lunar materials.

It could also be used to mine other materials for manufacturing purposes, such as oxygen, silicium, aluminium, iron and glass.

These could be used to manufacture spacecraft, solar cells, computer components and fuels as the first goods in which the Moon could trade with the Earth.

Garbage craft launched from the Moon could collect the hundreds of used satellites that clutter up the equatorial orbital zone 36,000km above the Earth.

This is a crucial zone for meteorological and communication satellites, and used satellites hurtling around in space make it increasingly unsafe.

In Stage Four Ehricke envisages nuclear fusion as a source of energy. Unmanned mines will widen the commodity base of the lunar econtomy, being controlled and supervised from the headquarters built during Stage O[illegible]

In Stage Five settlements could be established where people could live and work in conditions similar to those on Earth. The Moon would then be independent, and its inhabitants, although relying on trade with the Earth, could look after themselves and finance their own further investment.

Krafft Ehricke is not just letting his imagination run away with him. He expects his five stages to take at least half a century.

Technologically, work on Stage One could begin here and now. But in today's political landscape Ehricke sees, resignedly, no-one who would be prepared to take up his grand design.

Klaus Müller

(Die Welt, 4 October 1982)





BOOKS

Frankfurt fair: Yesterday's Religions in Today's World

Yesterday's Religions in Today's World was the topic of this year's Frankfurt book fair. It followed years in which the emphasis was on Latin America, children's reading and Black Africa.

It was high time, said fair director [illegible] Weidhaas, this sector of the book market was limelighted against the background of the book fair as a whole.

The topic was originally to have been [illegible], or man and technology, but the organisers eventually decided in favour of religion.

Religious issues, they felt, were gaining strongly in popularity. That alone was an argument that broke new ground as far as the Frankfurt book fair was concerned.

In the past it has sought year for year to plough a furrow that was either unknown, fallow or at least neglected, regardless whether or not it was gaining popularity.

Literature, the Frankfurt super-show stressed time and again, was not just for mass consumption; it must also be discovered.

Black Africa and Latin America, for instance, were suddenly found by European readers to be underestimated, not underdeveloped cultural communities.

They had scores of fine writers to offer as well as tourist attractions, citrus fruits and easily imported folklore fa[illegible].

Frankfurter Neue Presse

The Frankfurt book fair can deservedly claim to have evaluated them artistically, not just commercially.

This year the fair did not anticipate a trend; it followed one. So although the topic was an interesting one it was not designed to come as an eye-opener.

The religious debate is in a constant state of flux. Church assemblies, radio and TV regularly deal with new developments and familiarise a wider public with them.

Social psychology may have countless reasons to account for the increasing attention paid to religious phenomena by way of small sects or occult groups.

But it is hardly for a book fair to explain the trend, especially as religion does not directly influence, let alone encourage, the development of literature.

It may rely on books as a medium of spreading its ideas, thereby possibly boosting sales, but it does not account for a specific literary genre artistically distinct from others.

So discussions and special exhibitions in connection with this year's topic necessarily concentrated on religious disputes.

Exceptions to this contemplation of the naval, as it were, were exhibitions of religious bookbinding, Vatican Library editions and books on peace.

Over and above the world's major religions the organisers naturally stayed in tune with contemporary trends and paid attention to exotic outsiders.

An event typical of this interest in the unusual was a meeting arranged between the Dalai Lama and two Hopi Indian priests.

There were 135 events listed under the religious heading. They took place all over Frankfurt in museums, cinemas, university premises, church halls, religious centres, churches and hotels.

A central gathering was held at the exhibition grounds every afternoon. The opening topic was Religion: An Incitement to Peace or to Strife.

With Social Democrat Erhard Eppler in the chair it was a platform debate including church critic Karlheinz Deschner, Provost Dieter Trautwein from Frankfurt, Helmut Hild of the Protestant Church and authoress Luise Rinser.

The next subject was Coalition of Religions, with Professor Pinchas Lapide, a Jew, in the chair. He shared the platform with Alfred Grosser, the French political scientist, Margarethe Mitscherlich, the Frankfurt sociologist, and the Rev. Adolf Sommerauer.

Religion and Revolution, the next debate, featured Professor Johannes Baptist Metz, Karl Rahner and Walter Jens.

The Distant Neighbour was the subject dealt with by Dorothee Sölle, a woman theologian, on a day devoted to a wide range of women's issues related to the central topic.

Then came God and Everyday Life, in which a student, a soldier, a scientist, a doctor, a politician and a woman outlined their point of view.

Two exhibitions ran alongside this programme. They dealt with Yesterday's Religions in Today's World, and World Religions.

So religion was extensively covered at Frankfurt. There were lectures on peace, controversies over astrology and meetings on new trends in belief or on the difference between Christianity and Islam.

There were events held on the importance of mediation and the concept of reincarnation and on the position of the Church in the East bloc or the Third World.

Frankfurt is primarily a trade fair, attended by 5,600 exhibitors from 86 countries and visited by 175,000 people, including 60,000 booksellers and 6,000 journalists.

So, visitors were able to judge for themselves whether religion was really Yesterday's Religion. They may even have bought books on the subject they would not otherwise have bought.

But would they, after reading the books, know more about literature as well as more about religion?

Sabine Kinner

(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 1 October 1982)

Writers' row over 'soft line' taken against GDR

The German Writers' Association is in trouble over the resignation of [illegible] of its members who used to live in the GDR.

They have resigned in protest mainly against the attitude they say is taken by leading Munich writer Bernt Engelmann, the association's president.

They accuse him of pursuing a com[illegible], uncritical policy toward the GDR Writers' Association and of opportunistically abandoning political essentials such as German reunification.

Further arguments have been levelled by writers Horst Bienek, Günter Grass, [illegible] Härtling, Herbert Achternbusch and Stefan Endres.

They say he is overkeen on holding congresses, has an unduly bureaucratic outlook and is both arrogant and hard of hearing on views that differ from his [illegible]

They also disapprove of the way they say the association has soft-pedalled on [illegible] writers in prison. So the criticism covers a wide range.

Engelmann has never denied being a left-winger, but the clash has now assumed proportions greater than mere personalities.

It has led the association into a situation in which the very bedrock of its members feel its role should be [illegible] been called into question.

One question after another has been asked. How political can it allow itself to be? How far can it afford to disregard members' interests? Is it worth maintaining at all?

One of its problems is that it is no longer the sovereign association of free writers it was when it was founded in [illegible] after Heinrich Böll's memorable speech calling for "an end to modesty."

It was launched in a bid to get writers together and drag themout of their powerless isolation, to create a sense of common identity.

The association was to help defend writers' rights against the growing power of the media and publishers to dictate terms of contracts and conditions of work. Böll's speech and the outline of the tasks facing the association by Dieter Lattmann, the writer and SPD MP who got it off the ground, remain its magna carta, as it were.

By voluntarily abandoning independence and affiliating to Drupa, the printing workers' union, the association has redefined its role as tht of a social and economic interest group.

What it has accomplished along these lines is not to be sneezed at, although it has failed to get writers zero-rated for purposes of value-added tax.

It even failed to prevent an increase in VAT payable by writers, but it can lay claim to a number of achievements that count.

They include library royalties, royalties on photocopies, fees for reprints in school textbooks and social security provisions.

Affiliation to Drupa has changed the association completely. The need to reach agreement with the union on all moves of social policy relevance has stripped it of much of the reputation it once enjoyed.

It owed this reputation to the aura of being a free association of independent writers, whereas nowadays its public pronouncements are given only a half-hearing.

This is a gaping wound. It hurts and prompts dreams of political action despite the fact that nearly all well-known writers have withdrawn from the running of the association.

Red tape, bureaucracy and officialdom of the kind of which Engelmann is accused are running riot, as in the May Day appeal by the Berlin region.

"Those who write must march," it proclaimed. "Those who take part in the May Day march will prove they belong to the Writers' Association and the Printing and Paper Workers' Union."

Appeals of this kind testify to intellectual and linguistic poverty. P. W. Matthies, a writer who was reminded of similar appeals in the GDR, promptly resigned.

Yet this is merely a matter of the association's internal condition. It owes its public reputation to other factors and has got its emphasis wrong.

It began when Engelmann persuaded the association to endorse his peace appeal by German writers, which was well received abroad, and went on to use it entirely for his own purposes.

The result was a policy of cultivating relations with the GDR Writers' Association, originally launched by Lattmann but with somewhat different intentions.

In Hanover the association sponsored an event with the slogan High Time for Peace Propaganda at which two executive members of the GDR Writers' Association (one was novelist Hermann Kant) spoke.

The East Berlin peace talks held by writers from both German states late last year were followed by talks in The Hague and Cologne that increasingly emerged as an association activity.

It has absolutely no authority to engage in such activities, which has meant that it has had to set aside all consideration for members, especially those originally from the GDR, who felt the West German writers' association was a free agent.

They now see and read how its commitment to the cause of peace and self-imposed obligation to cooperate with writers' associations in the GDR and other East Bloc countries have limited its leeway.

By virtue of ties with counterparts in East Bloc countries where writers are persecuted it forfeits the ability to protest against such restrictions on writers' freedom.

It is increasingly unable even to maintain a variety of views within its own ranks.

Engelmann's mistake was in feeling he would be able to canvass support from all members for his good cause, whereas members were not in favour of the association being converted into an arm of political combat.

By virtue of political commitments the association has manoeuvred itself into a political pickle of a situation.

Will the remaining 2,000 members appreciate its predicament and realise that at present the association is well and truly caught without a leg to stand on.

Günther Rühle

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 25 September 1982)

■ SCHOLARSHIP

Book looks at Germans the Nazis booted out

The Nazis forced thousands of artists, writers, scholars and scientists to leave Germany in the 1930s. Since the war, little work has been done by Germans on this emigré phenomenon.

There have been plenty of politicians ready to emphasise the how importance of this type of research, but circumstances have been against their uncovering reminders of the past.

And the few institutions specialising in the subject have had their budgets cut systematically. Germany's foremost researcher in the field, Albert Walter, has resigned his chair at Hamburg University because of a cutback in funds.

Other countries, especially English-speaking countries, are doing more than Germany. There has been constant research made possible by a constant flow of funds.

Because of generous financial support American David Pike was able to publish his work on German emigré writers in the Soviet Union from 1933 to 1945 (*Deutsche Schriftsteller im sowjetischen Exil, 1933-1945*) published by Suhrkamp Verlag).

The book is the product of years of research work, some of it done at the central archives in Moscow and East Berlin after considerable opposition from East Bloc authorities.

Pike also managed to find and interview some survivors of that era, among them Margarete Buber-Neumann, Martin Esslin, Martha Feuchtwanger and Wieland Herzfelde.

Pike's book, concise and clearly written, is highly explosive. Understandably, the whole issue of emigrés has been depicted in euphemistic terms in the GDR — euphemistic to the point where some aspects have no semblance of reality.

The book revolves around three central issues. The first deals with the general and cultural policy of the German Communist Party (KPD) during the Weimar Republic. The second is the position of the emigrés in the Soviet Union and the third covers the war years until 1945. Here, Pike reviews how those who survived the Moscow show trials promoted the Soviet Union's war objectives.

Among them were primarily Becher, Weinert, Kurella, Plievier and Friedrich Wolf. All of them later joined Walter Ulbricht in becoming the founding fathers of the GDR.

Some of the information provided by David Pike has been largely unknown in West Germany. The knowledge of these elements makes it easier to understand the developments that eventually led to the establishment of the GDR.

The beginnings of this process can be traced back to the 1920s when Lenin and Trotsky put forward a new strategy: 'the united front.'

The new approach rested on the conviction that capitalism was at its last gasp and that its protracted ailment would culminate in a world revolution.

The united front, however, proved a tactical flop. The social democratic SPD refused to join forces with the communists even for a limited time. So the whole scheme failed.

But the intellectuals — above all writers — approved of the united front idea.

Authors like Heinrich Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, Bert Brecht, Becher, Lukacs, Gabor and Wittfogel enthusiastically joined in what they regarded as the "fight against fascism." They thus allowed themselves to be harnessed to projects in which the Central Committee of the Moscow Communist Party clearly pursued the aims of power politics, as we know today.

The Comintern construed the refusal of the social democrats to join forces with the communists as "social fascism."

Thus, for instance, Thälmann in 1929 called the Weimar coalition headed by the social democrat Müller a "social-fascist dictatorship," demonstrating the unrealistic idea the communists had of fascism.

It was this misinterpretation that dominated Moscow's policy towards the Nazis until well into the Second World War.

This also had an effect on the German writers who were driven into exile by the Nazis — in this case to the Soviet Union.

The writers also largely misunderstood the interests of the country to which they had fled, and they also wrongly evaluated the situation in Germany itself.

According to Pike, many authors — like the semi-official communist propaganda — believed in a mass resistance in Germany even during the first years of the war.

Pike substantiates this not only with letters and similar documents but also with those works of the emigré writers that dealt with German history. They held that Nazism had only temporarily gained the upper hand and that the development would climax in a world revolution.

The first victims of this tragic mistake were the emigrés themselves. They were caught up in the vortex of the power struggle in the course of which Stalin liquidated the old revolutionaries along with many German emigrés.

There is something nightmarish about Pike's description of the Moscow show trials. People who the day before had addressed communist meetings or had taught at schools were arrested from one moment to the next. The trumped up charges were mostly "Trotskyism," "deviation from the party line" or "cooperation with the Gestapo."

Every one of the people who were arrested was an idealist. They were people who had a vision of the Soviet Union as the first exemplary state that respected the freedom of the individual under the hallmark of socialism.

But there were also opportunists among the emigrés. They represented the small group of those who later became the intellectual elite of the GDR under Pieck and Ulbricht.

As far back as 1936 (at the 7th World Congress of the Comintern) Ulbricht said that it was the aim of communist policy to establish a Soviet Germany, says Pike.

But then came the "German Yeshovchina" named after Jeshov, the new head of the NKVD secret police, who, on Stalin's order, caused a bloodbath among German emigrés.

This was followed in 1941 by Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. A short while earlier, the Soviets had turned many German emigrés over to the Gestapo.

As Pike puts it, it is hard to say how the Germans in the Soviet Union responded to the terror that, in one way or another, affected all of them. Relatively few survived, and most of those who did later went to the GDR but never related the truth about their experiences.

In the final part of his book, the author describes the ineffectiveness of the frontline propaganda drive of the few German writers who served in the Red Army. They simply stuck to the old communist clichés to the effect that there were two Germanies: a Germany of Nazi parasites and a Germany of the workers.

The manifestos and appeals written along these lines and distributed among German prisoners of war met with little response.

Authors like Willi Bredel, Erich Weinert and Friedrich Wolf probably knew this but they had no choice but to follow the instructions of such communist leaders as Ulbricht and Pieck who, in their turn, acted on orders from the Kremlin.

Wolf Scheller

(Rheinische Post, 18 September 1982)

'Changes needed in Germanic studies'

Germanic studies are going through a crisis, despite the fact that students have rediscovered the nation's literature.

The Aachen Congress of Germanists were told that changes must be made. Germanic studies was an ill-defined discipline and it must be redefined.

Research money was given for practical benefits. That meant that Germanists must reconsider their contribution to the nation's intellectual life.

Professor Thomas Cramer, the literature historian who is chairman of the university Germanists' organisation, put it bluntly: "Only those who can plausibly explain how Germanic studies benefit society will survive."

It was unacceptable to include the production of teachers of German in the argument. In any case, these were not needed at the moment.

Hans Schwier, the Science and Research Minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, defended his demand for efficient universities that were not "just transit camps for all comers."

An interest in literature could not be allowed to go hand in hand with a lack of interest in society.

About 1,200 delegates from German-speaking countries, plus Scandinavia, the Benelux countries, France, Britain and Yugoslavia attended.

For the first time in 10 years, the two Germanist associations, secondary schools and university teachers, joined forces.

There are two Germanist associations, one of secondary school teachers and the other connected with the universities. For the first time for 10 years they held a joint meeting this year.

The problems of writers and other people are essentially the same, Swedish novelist Lars Gustafsson told the meeting. The only difference is that writers think they are entitled to w... about what will become of them in ... next 200 years, he said.

Gustafsson, a lecturer on philoso... and literature in Stockholm, stre... that writing had become a "litera... factory" and that such hasty praise... "the greatest writer of his generati..." rarely survive more than one season.

What he had in mind was the alle... "giants of the 1950s" like Alain Ro... Grillet, Michel Butor and Robert ... get. What had become of these auth... He said something like a hierar... system" had evolved in literature.

The "princes" were those w... works are read time and again wit... calling for new interpretations.

"Here, the text has become a ... scape in which even major cha... brought about by time can add ... more than a railroad line here an... new highway bridge there while ... overall contours remain unchanged.

(Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 5 October ...)

Paradise angri... denies dissent report

East Bloc regimes don't like the a... vities of a Bremen University ... partment that specialises in asse... dissent behind the iron curtain.

The Soviet periodical *Literatur... Gazeta* says the Research Institute ... Independent Literature and So... Movements in Eastern Europe is ... office for the fabrication of provo... tions against socialist countries."

The reason is that it digs out and ... lects dissenting East European publi... tions, although, as everyone kno... there is no dissent in European co... tries.

Head of the institute, Professor W... gang Eichwede, denies that he is a c... warrior. He says: "Other research... deal with civil rights movements in ... USA or events in the Federal Repub... of Germany. So why should we not d... with dissenting opinion in East... Europe?"

The institute has eight research... from a variety of disciplines. They co... centrate not only on underground ma... rial, but also on publications that b... official party lines but have someh... slipped through the censor.

"It is revealing to see how much ... tually manages to get past ... censor," says Professor Eichwede.

The variety of opinion in East B... countries can be compared with a m... netary system that has two exchan... rates: official and unofficial.

The latter includes the socal... *samizdat* publications, mostly typew... ten, mimeographed and secretly circ... ted. They deal with a wide range of ... pics including everyday problems, p... ry and political issues.

The pattern of dissent varies fr... country to country.

Take the Soviet Union. There wa... most total freedom of opinion after S... lin's death when the thaw set in. B... short while later the censors tighte... up again and many writers and intel... tuals had to go underground once m...

Czechoslovakia also had its wave ... repression by the government after ... short interlude of the "Pra... Spring".

(Lübecker Nachrichten, 24 September ...)

...EDICINE

Experiments with twins used to find causes of mental illness

...long-term study involving 100 pairs of twins suggests that biologi... ...tors could play a role in mental ...

...e our forebears accepted psycho... ...disorders as divine punishment ...ply attributed them to demons, ...n science regards neuroses and ...somatic disorders as a delayed ...uence of psychological traumas ...y childhood, disturbing experien... ...adulthood or hereditary — de... ...ng on the particular school of psy... ...gy.

...aim of the study by a team of ...al doctors, psychoanalysists and ...ists headed by Professors Anne... ...eigl-Evers (Psychotherapeutic Cli... ...Düsseldorf University) and Heinz ...ank (Psychosomatic Clinic in ...heim of Heidelberg University) is ...ally resolve the conflicting theo...

...research project with the twins is ...larly suitable in showing whether ...n characteristics are of a genetic ...or whether they are due to the ...nment because identical (one... ...twins also have identical genetic ...ial.

...it turns out that a pair of identical ...has a greater similarity of a speci... ...characteristic than non-identical ...egg) twins, who have only half the ...e material in common, it becomes ...s that the characteristic in ques... ...is hereditary.

...f of the 100 pairs of twins came ...the Institute for Psychogenic Dis... ...s in Berlin and the other half from ...ower Saxony State Hospital in Tie... ...nn. (The results of the study have ...summed up in a report entitled ...nge *seelisch bedingter Krankhei...* ...- Origins of Psychological Disor... ...- published by Vandenhoeck & ...cht, Göttingen.)

... among the twins the resear... ...picked one who suffered from a ...is, a psychosomatic disorder or a ...ic character disorder.

...the end, there were 36 identical ...4 non-identical twins, half of the ...being of the same sex.

...patients and their initially anony... ..."other halves" were examined for ...st time at the beginning of the ...and then again at the end of the ...

...thorough psychoanalytical diagno... ...ns made for each of them, ...shing the severity of the disorder. ...dition, the children underwent ...ological tests as well.

...results concerning the Berlin ...n indicate that hereditary factors ...a role in the psychological disor... ...ays Professor Schepank.

...2 per cent of the cases, one of the ...had exactly the same (out of 664 ...ed symptoms) symptoms as its ...al twin; in the case of non-identi... ...ins, the coincidence was 16 per ...e. exactly half.

...nalysing the most severe and im... ...symptoms of a twin, the resear... ...arrived at an identity rate of 52 ...nt for the one-egg twins and only ...er cent for the two-egg twins.

...identity of symptoms was much ...pronounced in children than in ...dults — possibly because psychologi... ...disorders in adult life are much more than in childhood due to social conditions.

Neurotic-depressive symptoms and behavioural disorders of a schizoid nature along with aggression seem to be particularly subject to hereditary factors because here the similarity was particularly pronounced in identical twins.

Another thing that appears to be subject to biological elements is the extent to which a disorder handicaps the patient and makes him suffer from it.

Identical twins differed on only 3.8 out of a possible 24 points regarding the severity of their suffering while non-identical twins differed by a whole 5 points.

In a further step of the investigation, the researchers examined the Berlin twins to establish the role early childhood events played in bringing about neuroses.

Such events included above all the lack of important persons of reference (parents, etc.) and rejection by the mother.

The ultimate balance sheet showed that patients who, in their early formative years, were subjected to severe emotional strains subsequently developed more and more severe symptoms than those who were subjected to a lesser stress.

Much to the researchers' surprise, complications during pregnancy and birth played no role at all regarding the extent and frequency of subsequent neuroses and psychosomatic disorders, although the new school of psychotherapy attaches particular importance to such factors.

The identical twins among the Tiefenbrunn patients barely differed from their non-identical opposite numbers regarding the severity of their affliction.

Annelise Heigl-Evers attributes this to the higher average age (40) of these twins. Older people are simply more frequently subjected to stress situations — regardless of their genetic background.

On the other hand, there was an above average identity of symptoms in one-egg twins. The main symptoms here were similar in 53 per cent of the cases compared with 14 per cent for non-identical twins.

It appears that the genes have a greater influence on the type of psychological disorder and a lesser influence on the extent to which the patient suffers from the disorder.

The Tiefenbrunn twins also showed more frequent and severe psychological disorders in later life if they had suffered psychological traumas in childhood.

But individual and specific traumas (as in pregnancy and birth or in the case of excessive cleanliness demands in childhood or the absence of the mother) by themselves had almost no harmful effects. Such traumas become disastrous only if they are cumulative.

The mental development of a person evidently also depends on early childhood factors: test persons who were exposed to medium or heavy strains in childhood performed below average in IQ tests while those who experienced no childhood strains showed average results.

Persons with a favourable childhood performed better at school and in vocational training.

Even in the age group between 7 and 21, the absence of a mother and changing foster parents had an unfavourable effect on performance at school and psychological health.

Rolf Degen

(Der Tagesspiegel, 2 October 1982)

German psychology runs into a mental block over language

The German Society for Psychology is to try and get the most important German works on the subject published in English-language international journals.

It wants a greater international audience and there are 15 times as many English speaking people as German speakers.

Delegates to the society's 33rd congress in Mainz were told of the difficulties: of the leading journals in psychology, only published in English are read worldwide. Publications carrying material translated into English are not.

Material published in German goes unnoticed. The problem is, the meeting was told, it is impossible in this field to translate without loss of meaning.

Psychology as a science has never had it easy in Germany. One reason is because German psychology was caught up in the vortex of politics 50 years ago and lost its leading position in the world.

Another is because it has never quite managed to dispel common prejudices. The latter was largely due to the fact that many people in psychology spoke out when they weren't qualified to.

This applies today more than ever, the congress was told.

The meeting, organised by the head of the Psychology Department of Mainz University, Professor Ewert, puts its emphasis on two major aspects: It wants to usher in a self-critical review in the light of the fact that during the Nazi era many leading psychologists were expelled not only from German universities but also from the German Society for Psychology. This issue is to be dealt with further at next year's congress.

The other major aspect is the divergence of schools of thought and groupings. The objective is to keep the dialogue going and to determine the position of scientific psychology in a broad and motley environment that even includes pseudo-psychological activities.

The concern over the cohesion of psychology as a science is not only due to the fact that psychological research (as in the sectors of medicine or sociology) is in danger of being downgraded to the position of a minor issue; it is also due to the fact that it has become impossible clearly to define the various fields of practising psychology. They range from the psychotherapist in a hospital all the way to the social director of package tours.

Scientific psychologists complain that clever fellow "psychologists" only need to say that they are spearheading a new approach to find their weekend seminars full of people seeking help.

The experts do not deny that some of these people actually provide help. What they do criticise is that there is no scientific control of their work and that there are no long-term checks on results.

Any new drug is subjected to strict controls before gaining approval. Yet the psychological techniques of "soul doctors" are let loose on the public without a second thought. Anything goes for which there is a market.

In the long run, the president of the Society, Professor Heinz Heckhausen, told the meeting, it will be necessary to define the various fields of psychology in the interest of rational scientific work.

The disproportionate run on psychology as a course of university study in the 1960s is seen as one of the reasons for the present state of affairs.

At that time, the psychology departments of the universities were overtaxed to the point wher research was virtually dead.

The introduction of the *numerus clausus* (university entrance restrictions) led to an improvement after 1972. But the benefits were nullified by the introduction of wrong examination procedures.

As early as the second half of their course of studies, the students were allowed to specialise; and this deprived them of a broad basis of knowledge and curtailed their mobility on the labour market.

Moreover, it turned out that 75 per cent of the students intended to go into clinical psychology, which meant that this field had to be expanded at the expense of other areas.

Professor Heckhausen pointed specifically to work and industrial psychology, which have met with almost no interest. In fact, these fields were subsequently maligned on ideological grounds as "the signs of how to manipulate the workers." As a result, even industry lost interest.

The Society is therefore trying to promote these fields by subsidising doctoral dissertations.

But it will take 20 to 30 years — a whole generation of researchers — before German psychology catches up with top international research in these fields.

All branches of German psychology

Continued on page 14

■ CHILDREN

Family and school blamed for mayhem in classroom and playground

Aggression and a destructive urge are growing in German schools. The reason, say two researchers, lies in the nature of the German school and the German home.

The family responsibility is bringing up the child and shaping its character while the school has been reduced to being no more than an institution to convey knowledge.

Ulrike Koester and Christian Büttner say that this has led to a performance and competition system in which the student feels isolated and helpless. The result is laziness, lying, cheating, fear and aggression, they say.

Koester and Büttner outline their research in a study, *Liebe und Hass im Unterricht* (Love and Hate in the Classroom), published by Beltz Verlag, Berlin.

In it, they outline the behaviour they are trying to explain: children reporting sick en masse, excessive drinking to the point of illness, assaults resulting in hospital cases, blackmail.

Other symptoms of aggression: door locks plugged with chewing gum, demolished lamps, ripped carpets and smashed toilet bowls.

Teachers are threatened and attacked. Water and stink bombs are thrown in class.

One teacher said students drove into class on mopeds and defecated.

Hannoversche Allgemeine

"Some gangs show up armed with clubs, knuckle dusters, knives and the like," says a woman 9th grade teacher at a Munich school. She found one student with a loaded pistol.

Severe punch-ups are a daily occurrence. Children en route to school are no longer just roughed up but so beaten up that they need medical attention.

Children terrorise others, telling them either to steal or get beaten up.

In one Cologne school, two 15-year-old boys put a chain around a girl's neck, tightened it and forced her to undress.

In Hanover, two 3rd graders pushed a 6-year-old girl's head into the toilet bowl and pulled the chain.

Why? The authors, a woman teacher and a psychologist, stress that the reasons lie in the conflict between the students' needs and emotions and school as an institution.

More than ever before, teachers are forced to repress the spontaneous needs of children because giving in to them would interfere with instruction. There is no place in the classroom for sentiments and emotions.

Instruction is formalised and ritualised, which means that emotion and sensuality have been barred. So the school cannot convey social knowledge.

As a result, the social learning process takes place outside the classroom in the form of power struggles.

Schools, say the authors, do little to make the students aware of social processes in which they experience themselves and others.

The most important things a student has to learn is not to violate the formalised rules that ensure the functioning of the institution school.

Almost all educational experts agree that brutality at school is not only a school but an overall social problem. The problem begins in the home where the child finds no recognition, no openness and no haven.

According to the Bavarian Teachers Association (GEW), the trouble is largely due to wrong upbringing methods by parents: they deny their children praise yet expect too much in terms of performance. This has led to a permanent conflict.

GEW spokesman Klaus Weinzierl: "Today's parents are too permissive. Though a child needs a great deal of freedom, it should also know its limits. A child must learn to control himself and show consideration for others.

"Naturally, some of the brutality must be blamed on the schools. As long as our school buildings resemble 20th century teaching factories the children cannot feel happy in them.

"Our schools are too large to enable children to establish contacts with each other. It's the monumentality of this architecture that fuels aggression."

Having realised that schools could be too small, our educational policy makers now have to come to realise they can also be too big.

Incidentally, the best way of pre[venting] children from defacing the wa[lls of] their glass and concrete schools is to [en]courage them to decorate them.

The study concludes that wha[t is] need is smaller classes and the re[duc]tion of examination rituals to an a[bso]lute minimum plus more sensible c[urri]culums.

Only if school is once more tu[rned] into an environment in which the [stu]dent is happy will some of the ag[gres]sion be eliminated.

Barbara Rö[...]

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 18 Septembe[r ...])

Mental block

Continued from page 13

have yet another problem to deal w[ith:] the English language, which has [be]come prevalent in international [re]search. Of the leading psycholo[gical] journals, only those published in [En]glish are read world-wide. Transl[ated] publications play only a peripheral [role].

Material published in German [goes] unnoticed. While the natural scie[nces] and medicine can still adapt to [this] trend, German psychology has stuc[k to] German as its language because it is [im]possible in this field to translate the [en]tire speaking and thinking processe[s wi]thout loss of substance.

But since there are 15 times as m[any] English-speaking people as there [are] German speakers, an effort mus[t be] made to be heard on an interna[tional] plane.

The German Society for Psych[ology] is trying to attract more attentio[n to] scientific psychology in German[y as] well through its prize for scientific [jour]nalism on psychology.

This year's prize went to Dieter [Zim]mer for a series of articles in the w[eekly] *Die Zeit*.

Rotraut H[...]

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 1 Octobe[r ...])

Community work a popular alternative to jail

Community work instead of prison for juveniles is becoming a popular alternative in the justice system.

A Munich pilot project was started four years ago and now the idea has spread to four other cities in Germany. Christian Pfeiffer, chairman of the project *Die Brücke* (The Bridge), says there have even been inquiries from Japan.

Every year, 7,500 youngsters are convicted in Munich on various charges. Now, 3,000 are sentenced to do community work.

It involves weekend work, and although many find it tough having to give up leisure time, only 2 per cent try and dodge it after sentence.

Often, but not always, the experience changes attitudes towards society: a former punk involved in a brawl during a drinking spree and sentenced to work in an old people's home.

After serving out his sentence, he decided to stay on in the home. He is now taking a course to become a male nurse.

Munich uses the community work alternative more often than other cities not because the courts are less strict or more progressive, but because it [is ea]sier there.

This is largely because *Die Br[ücke]* has, since the spring of 1978, h[elped] find the work. Most is in old pe[ople's] homes or hospitals, but some is ga[rden]ing or other manual labour, cle[aning] and helping out in offices.

Altogether, 100,000 hours are sp[ent at] 130 different places of work.

Die Brücke also helps look [after] youngsters who get into trouble [and] who don't have a suitable home [back]ground to help them. Sixty a ye[ar are] sent by judges to *Die Brücke* [to be] looked after by social workers.

The whole project costs DM500[...] year, but it is estimated that the va[lue of] the work plus the relief to the [prison] system means that the cost is a[lmost] nothing.

Herr Pfeiffer is a lecturer in cri[mino]logy and penology at Munich Uni[versi]ty who has written a book on the [sub]ject of work instead of punishment.

Similar projects to his have be[en set up in] Cologne, Berlin, Kiel, Bielefeld [and in] smaller places like Starnberg and E[...]berg.

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 1 Octob[er ...])

CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

Boring, is children's verdict on lessons about Weimar Republic, Third Reich

[...] Third Reich ought to be dealt [w]ith earlier at school, Israeli and [...]n educationalists conclude from [experim]ental history lessons on the [h]olocaust and an accompanying [...]st West Berlin schools.

[The c]ourse was taken by 11 classes at [compre]hensive and high schools in the [...] school year. Schoolgirls who [...] through the regular course in [Third] Reich history were first asked [what] they remembered.

[...] said they recalled the provoca[tive ap]pearance of young people wear[ing ...] uniforms modelled on the SS [...] show on the Nazi era.

[...] said that in history lessons on [the Sec]ond World War some classmates [de]alt in detail with specific wea[pons s]uch as tanks or aircraft, showing [...] in the technical side of war.

[...] they had shown no interest in [...] aspects of National Socialism. [...] lessons were generally felt to be [...] because they were dry and full [...].

[...] figures were off-putting. Greater [...] was not apparent until the les[sons ...] round to historical personalities [...]ground, such as Hitler.

[The] history of the Weimar Republic [was fe]lt to be particularly dry and bor[ing. C]lasses were said to have shown [...] about the persecution of the [...] taught in conventional history [...].

[...] the moment the bell rang and chaos reigned, they let off steam by voicing the old slogans: "Jew Out!" "Foreigners Out!" or "It's high time we reopened the gas chambers."

Scientific evaluation of the experiment was supervised by Arye Carmon of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and Jürgen Helmchen, a West Berlin educationalist.

Now that aspects of the Nazi outlook were resurfacing, they felt shortcomings neither educationalists nor politicians had successfully counteracted were partly to blame.

The young were particularly hard hit by unemployment and its social repercussions, which lent pro-Nazi elements a certain weight that ought to be dealt with by political means as a counterweight.

Even 40 years after the event, dealing in detail with the Nazi era and the holocaust of the German bid to exterminate the Jews struck at the heart of a taboo, the two men said.

They were topics that were not felt to form part of everyday political understanding. Taboos invariably prompted provocative behaviour, and that was how they explained the Berlin schoolchildren's behaviour.

The two educationalists began by noting that there was no general standard of knowledge among 16-year-old comprehensive and high school students about the Third Reich.

Knowledge varied and was sketchy, frequently relying on what had been gathered from adults or resulted from discussion with others of their own age.

Students were less interested in the mere facts than in psychological aspects, such as the influence National Socialism exercised on the young or the personality of those responsible for the "final solution" of the Jewish problem.

When history lessons had been successful, students showed interest in comparisons between the Nazi era and what it might mean if it were to happen again today.

The overwhelming majority of students proved, after the experimental course, more sensitive toward discrimination against social and ethnic minorities than they had been beforehand.

The way in which they accepted each other, and others, as they were was a definite change for the better, said Dr Carmon and Dr Helmchen.

They were much readier to accept new classmates from abroad.

In many cases 15- and 16-year-olds had said their parents (or their generation) were frequently reverting to mistakes of old.

They were advocating the same means of coping with crises and laying the blame in much the same way as the generation of their grandparents had done.

The experiment was run by Dr Carmon with backing from the Berlin educational studies centre. Funds were allocated by both Bonn and Berlin and administered by the Max Planck Educational Research Institute.

Dr Carmon was working on the assumption that in the final analysis the holocaust was not rationally explainable, but Berlin teachers felt this was an outsider's view.

Berlin teachers associated with the project did not want to play down the emotional effect of the course but they were keen to put across facts as well as feelings.

The aim of the experiment, as they saw it, was not only to stimulate emotion but to enable students to reach conclusions relevant to their future activities and democratic understanding.

Depending on the class, between four and 20 special history lessons were given. Where students did project work of their own they were invariably found to develop a new approach to each other.

The final report on the experiment raises a fundamental issue. Ought history lessons in senior school to deal with their subject in strict chronological order?

Did not the Third Reich make its appearance in the curriculum far too late for 15- and 16-year-olds?

Young people are confronted with vestiges of Nazi or authoritarian ideology or neo-Nazi ideas at a much earlier age. Dr Carmon and Dr Helmchen suggest dealing with the Third Reich earlier, arguably even in the final class at primary school as part of lessons in German or religious instruction.

If the holocaust were taken as the starting point of history lessons at senior school it would be easier to foster a more direct understanding and appreciation of contemporary democracy.

Uwe Schlicht

(Der Tagesspiegel, 23 September 1982)

Speer accused of 'writing to whitewash his own role'

Matthias Schmidt, *Albert Speer — Das Ende eines Mythos* (Albert Speer — The End of a Myth), Scherz-Verlag, Berne and Munich 1982, 302pp, DM29.80.

[...], neither historians nor rea[ders ...] interested in recent history [...] that Matthias Schmidt's boo[k on Alb]ert Speer is a major contributio[n to Thir]d Reich studies.

[He p]resents documentary evidence to [back] his case that Speer, a young [archite]ct and friend of the Führer who [wen]t to become wartime Minister of [Armam]ents Production, was not strictly [...] in his version of events.

[In a] number of points he shows that [Speer] was over-generous in his treat[ment o]f historical truth, first in his 1969 [memoi]rs, then in his *Spandau Diaries* [and fin]ally in his *Slave State*, published [just be]fore he died last year.

[...] showed how wise it was to take [a] detached view of the writings of [a man] who was once one of Hitler's [...]. Speer did not write about his[tory in] a manner likely to withstand cri[tical sc]rutiny. He wrote, and he wrote [with su]btle skill, to whitewash his own [role].

[As] architect he was happy to com[ply wi]th the Führer's mania for the gi[gantic]. He was proud of enjoying Hit[ler's co]nfidence and invariably referred [to ...] goals."

[...] the Battle of the Ardennes was [...] 1944 he made a speech in which [he was s]o insistent on holding out until [the bitt]er end that even a senior Wehr[macht o]fficer felt embarrassed.

[He] was an intelligent man and as [soon as] Hitler committed suicide he set [about] fashioning himself a reputation [for hav]ing been a mere technocrat in [the Naz]i hierarchy.

[At t]he end of April 1945 he gave [Arno] Breker, the sculptor, 80,000 [Reichsm]arks to hand over to his family [and set] out for Flensburg to make sure that Dönitz, the Führer's successor, did nothing stupid.

Ever since, at Nuremberg and throughout his 20 years in jail, he was felt to have been a basically decent man and a mere specialist in his field.

In the dying days of the war he had prevented the total destruction of vital facilities, but he failed to appreciate the criminal character of the regime until it was too late.

Even American officers were impressed when Speer in Nuremberg behaved as a gentleman and admitted to an abstract overall responsibility.

When he was released from Spandau his memoirs were a bestseller. So Schmidt has broken the spell of a man who gained a measure of popularity in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Schmidt has brought to light the contradictions in Speer's chronicles of his official activities in the Third Reich.

There is a copy in the Federal Archives in Koblenz and another in the Institute of Current Affairs. They differ slightly but significantly from the original, which is held by Rudolf Wolters, a friend of his.

Wolters, a fellow-architect who shared his views on all but a few points in his memoirs, told Speer he had made a few cuts in the version of the chronicles supplied to the Federal Archives.

Unfortunately, he wrote, the cuts might not necessarily have been unimportant in terms of contemporary history.

When the two versions are compared it will be seen that this double negative was absolutely right. The cuts were extremely telling.

Speer wrote, for instance, that during his term as inspector-general of architecture for Berlin 23,765 Jewish apartments were "classified" and 75,000 people "rehoused."

The point here is that from Nuremberg to his final book Speer consistently argued that he could have found out about the mass murder of the Jews in the Third Reich if he had wanted.

The photostats in Schmidt's book indicate that Speer is likely to have known more than he admitted during his own lifetime.

Speer was first questioned about the discrepancy between versions of his chronicles by David Irving, the British historian, who had come across an original version in the Imperial War Museum, London.

With the aid of the edited versions Speer retained his reputation in Germany of having been a highly qualified but apolitical technocrat.

He was reputed to have been a member of Hitler's wartime Cabinet who had ties with the 20 July 1944 resistance group and was envisaged by them as retaining a portfolio if their coup succeeded.

But his name was pencilled in with a question mark and a note that he was not to be approached until later.

How strange it was that the envisaged resistance man happened on the day of the bid to assassinate Hitler to be in Goebbels' Press officer's office suggesting ways and means of suppressing the generals' revolt!

Schmidt's book does more than shed fresh light on Speer the man and his credibility. It must also help to disabuse many Germans, especially older Germans, who feel the Third Reich was not all evil.

Albert Speer, they argue, is an example of the way National Socialism was capable of committing crimes of gigantic proportions but was not all bad when it came to those who supported it.

Speer is cast in the role of a decent expert who was tragically involved in the seamier side of the Third Reich.

As seen by Schmidt, he appears, more credibly, to have been the most astute career man under Hitler.

He first made masterly use of the political machinery of the Third Reich. Then, despite the handicap of his Nuremberg sentence, he succeeded in gaining a hearing in post-war German democracy.

He succeeded, according to plan, in suppressing the facts, and no less a person than J. K. Galbraith conceded, after interviewing him, that Speer had rightly assumed the Americans and the British would admire his keen mind and his technical skill.

Gerd Ressing

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